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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this 
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a judgment of the Third District 
Court certified as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the 
appeal was transferred to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court correctly dismissed on summary judgment 
Appellants' claims against Defendant Del Rio, Inc. ("Del Rio"), for a declaration of an 
interest in the Oil Canyon Leases pursuant to the 1995 Agreement. 
This issue involves the following sub-issues, among others: 
a. Whether the 1995 Agreement granted Appellants any rights in any 
leases. 
b. Whether it would be reasonable to interpret the term "additional 
leases" in the 1995 Agreement as referring to the Oil Canyon Leases, which were already 
in existence. 
c. Whether the trial court acted within its discretion in denying, fifteen 
months after the litigation began and three months after the summary judgment motion 
was filed, Appellants' request under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
delay ruling on the summary judgment motion to allow Appellants to depose Defendant 
Dan Shaw and non-party Gerald Nielson. 
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Brockbank v. 
Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251, ^ 10, 32 P.3d 990. A court may interpret and apply a 
1 
contract on a motion for summary judgment when the terms are "complete, clear, and 
unambiguous." Aspenwood L.L.C. v. C.A.T., L.L.C, 2003 UT App 28, ^ 30, 73 P.3d 
947. 
A trial court's ruling on a Rule 56(f) request is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
An appellate court will not reverse a trial court's denial of such a request "unless the 
decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Holmes v. American States Ins. Co., 2000 
UT App 85,^26, lP.3d552. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly dismissed on summary judgment Appel-
lants' claims against Del Rio for a declaration that Appellants were entitled to a share in 
the cash settlement proceeds that the Defendants had received pursuant to the settlement 
of the Federal Litigation. 
Please see issue number one for the applicable standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual Background. 
This lawsuit focuses primarily on ten leases of federal land for oil and gas 
exploration and development (the "Oil Canyon Leases"). (See Complaint, Addendum 
Exhibit 1, fflj 16-19, R. 3.) The Oil Canyon Leases, formerly part of the "Oil Canyon II 
Drilling Unit," involve some 16,280 acres of land on the Uintah and Ouray Indian 
Reservation in the Book Cliffs area of central Utah. Since the early 1980s, the record title 
and working interests in the Oil Canyon Leases have been held by non-party Del-Rio 
2 
Drilling Programs, Inc. ("Del-Rio Drilling"), a subsidiary of Defendant/Appellee Del-Rio 
Resources, Inc. ("Del Rio"), and numerous other entities and individuals.1 (R. 166-67.) 
Del-Rio Drilling was the "operator" of the Oil Canyon II Unit and was thus responsible 
for the day-to-day exploration, drilling and production operations on all of the leases 
within the Unit. (R. 84.) 
In 1983, access to the leased lands was cut off by the surface owner, the Ute Indian 
Tribe, which action was supported by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of 
Land Management, two divisions within the United States Department of the Interior. (R. 
84-85.) In September 1986, after access still had not been restored, litigation was 
initiated in the United States Court of Claims (the "Federal Litigation") by Del-Rio 
Drilling and other parties who held interests in the Oil Canyon Leases (the "Federal 
Plaintiffs"). (R. 138-58.) There were a total of twenty-seven Federal Plaintiffs. (R. 138.) 
The four plaintiffs/appellants in this action, Jay Kirk, Steven Martens, Syndicators, Inc., 
and Western United Mines, Inc. ("Western"), collectively referred to herein as 
"Appellants,"3 were among the Federal Plaintiffs. (Id.) Defendant Del Rio was also one 
of the Federal Plaintiffs, but Defendant Daniel Shaw was not. (Id.) Mr. Gerald Nielson, 
1
 Interests in oil and gas leases may consist of working interests, overriding royalty 
interests, net profits interests, record title interests, etc. 
Upon information and belief, Martens is the President of Syndicators; Kirk is the 
President of Western; and both Kirk and Martens are directors of Syndicators and 
Western. Additionally, both Kirk and Martens were also officers and directors of Del Rio 
until 1995. (R. 85.) 
Del Rio recognizes that use of this reference is disfavored under Rule 24(d) but 
respectfully submits that using any other descriptive term would cause confusion or be 
unwieldy. 
3 
Esq., represented the Federal Plaintiffs, in exchange for a 25% interest in the Oil Canyon 
Leases and wells drilled on the land covered by those Leases. (R. 170-71.) 
When the Federal Litigation began, record title and working interests in the Oil 
Canyon Leases were held in varying percentages by a number of companies and individ-
uals, including Del-Rio Drilling, Syndicators, Natural Gas Corporation of California or its 
subsidiaries, Mono Power Company, Exxon Corporation, and Joan Chorney. (See R. 
166-68.) There were also a number of overriding royalty owners and owners with rights 
to net profits. (R. 167.) 
Not all of the record title and working interest owners agreed to participate in the 
Federal Litigation. (R. 167-68.) Those owners, including Natural Gas Corporation of 
California, Mono Power Company, Exxon, and Joan Chorney chose not to maintain their 
interests in the Oil Canyon Leases and agreed to assign their interest to Del-Rio Drilling. 
(Id.) A number of those assignments were executed and delivered to the BLM in 1987 
and 1988 but were rejected by the BLM as untimely due to the termination of the leases. 
04) 
During the fifteen-year pendency of the Federal Litigation,4 the Oil Canyon Leases 
expired.5 (R. 168.) 
4
 The Federal Litigation generated at least three published opinions. See Del-Rio 
Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. CI. 186 (1996), opinion withdrawn and 
superseded by 37 Fed. CI. 157 (1997), rev'd, 146 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
5
 Like other federal oil and gas leases, the leases at issue in this case required that 
oil and gas be produced in paying quantities within a certain period of time, or else the 
leases would expire automatically. 
4 
B. The 1995 Agreement. 
In November 1993, Shaw agreed to loan a sum of money to Del Rio to rework 
wells located on two other federal leases (leases U-10166 and U-19837). (R. 104.) 
(These other federal leases were not part of the Federal Litigation and are not at issue in 
this case.) As security for the loan, Syndicators, Western, and Del Rio pledged to Shaw 
their interests in those two federal leases and two additional state oil and gas leases (ML-
44317 and ML-44318) (which also are not at issue). (R. 104.) Syndicators and Western 
were jointly liable with Del Rio to repay the amounts that Shaw advanced. (R. 104.) 
Shaw advanced $791,260 to Del Rio, but neither Del Rio, Syndicators, nor Wes-
tern was able to repay him. (R. 104.) Accordingly, on May 12, 1995, Shaw entered into 
an agreement with Del Rio, Kirk, Martens, Syndicators, and Western (the "1995 
Agreement"), in which Del Rio, Kirk, Martens, Syndicators, and Western conveyed 
outright to Shaw all of their interests in the two federal leases and the two state leases that 
had earlier been pledged as security. (1995 Agreement, Addendum Exhibit 2 hereto, R. 
104-137.) In exchange, Shaw agreed to forgive the $791,600 debt. (Id) 
This litigation arose out of paragraphs 4, 4.1, and 4.2 of the 1995 Agreement. 
Paragraph 4 acknowledged that "various individuals and companies" were plaintiffs in the 
Federal Litigation, involving the ten Oil Canyon Leases, and stated that Shaw would use 
his best efforts to enter into an agreement with the "plaintiffs of such lawsuit" to provide 
up to $30,000 in funding for litigation expenses: 
Various individuals and companies are plaintiffs in a lawsuit filed against 
the United States in the United States Claims Court[] involving a claim for 
oil and gas leases and money damages (Case No. 569-86L). Plaintiffs 
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require additional money to fund additional on-going litigation expenses. 
As additional consideration for Del-Rio, Western, Syndicators, Kirk[,] 
Caldwell and Martens entering into this Agreement, Shaw shall use his best 
efforts to enter into an agreement with the plaintiffs of such [Federal] 
lawsuit to provide a maximum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) to 
fund certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in such litigation" 
(1995 Agreement, f^ 4 (emphasis added).) 
The 1995 Agreement further stated that any agreement between "the plaintiffs and 
Shaw" would provide that if "additional" leases were awarded as a result of the litigation, 
those leases would be assigned to Shaw, but that the "plaintiffs" would be entitled to a 
"fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest" in such leases: 
Any agreement between the plaintiffs and Shaw shall provide that if, as a 
result of the litigation, additional leases are awarded, such leases shall be 
assigned to Shaw (or his affiliates); provided, however, plaintiffs shall be 
entitled to a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in such additional 
leases. 
(1995 Agreement <[ 4.1 (emphasis added).) 
Finally, the 1995 Agreement contained similar terms relating to the disposition of 
any cash that may be recovered as a result of the Federal Litigation: 
Any agreement between plaintiff(s) and Shaw shall provide that [if], as a 
result of the litigation, a cash settlement is awarded to plaintiffs, Shaw shall 
be reimbursed for all expenses of litigation paid by Shaw and the balance 
of the proceeds shall be delivered free and clear of the claims of Shaw, to 
plaintiffs as damages and for payment of other expenses and costs of the 
litigation. 
(1995 Agreement ^ 4.2 (emphasis added).) 
Two months before the 1995 Agreement was executed, Appellants' own attorney, 
Robert McDonald, acknowledged that paragraph 4 was "an unenforceable 'agreement to 
agree.'" (Letter from Robert McDonald to A.O. Headman, March 23, 1995, R. 211.) 
6 
Regarding paragraph 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement, Mr. McDonald advised that "I have dif-
ficulty understanding how this paragraph can be implemented inasmuch as all of the 
plaintiffs in the litigation are not parties to this agreement." (Id.) Plaintiff Kirk was also 
advised that fl[i]t is extremely difficult to successfully enforce a 'best effort' obligation 
inasmuch as there is no clear standard to measure the obligor's performance." (Letter 
from Robert McDonald to Jay Kirk, April 26, 1995, R. 215.) 
C. The Settlement of the Federal Litigation. 
Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs never reached a funding agreement as contem-
plated by the 1995 Agreement, though Shaw did advance approximately $20,000 to Del 
Rio for litigation costs. (R. 173-74.) The Federal Litigation was resolved by a Settlement 
Agreement dated March 13, 2001. (R. 159-64.) The Settlement Agreement did not 
award the Federal Plaintiffs any new leases. The Settlement Agreement did provide, 
however, that the terms of the Oil Canyon Leases would be deemed "tolled" during the 
pendency of the Litigation and "extended" for three years after the dismissal of the 
Litigation. (R. 159.) The Settlement Agreement also provided that the BLM would pay 
the Federal Plaintiffs $300,000 in damages. (R. 159.) 
Since fmalization of the Settlement Agreement and consistent therewith, Del Rio 
and Del-Rio Drilling have recognized the historical record title, working, and royalty 
ownership interests of the parties who owned interests in the Oil Canyon Leases when the 
Federal Litigation began. (R. 87.) None of the interests in any of those Leases was 
assigned to Shaw. (R. 174.) Del Rio also attempted to distribute the settlement proceeds 
consistent with the respective ownership interests of the Federal Plaintiffs. (R. 87.) 
7 
Appellants Kirk and Martens, however, demanded for themselves and their com-
panies a fifty percent interest in the Oil Canyon Leases, regardless of the interests of the 
other parties involved in the Federal Litigation who owned those leases when the Litiga-
tion began. (R. 87.) Appellants also demand a significant portion of the settlement 
proceeds. (Id.) When Del Rio and Shaw refused to accede to Appellants' demands, 
Appellants initiated this action. 
D. The Litigation. 
On July 23, 2001, Appellants filed this lawsuit. The Complaint alleged that the 
Appellants and the Defendants were parties to the 1995 Agreement and averred that 
Appellants were "entitled to a beneficial interest in the 10 leases according to the [1995] 
Agreement." (Complaint, Add. Ex. 1, ^ | 19, R. 3.) The Complaint further alleged that the 
Appellants were entitled to a beneficial interest in eight additional sections of land 
"according to the Agreement," and that Appellants were entitled to a share of the cash 
settlement "according to the Agreement." (Complaint ^ 22, 24.) The Complaint alleged 
that the Defendants "proposed distribution of the settlement with the United States in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the Agreement," and asserted that the Appellants were 
"entitled to declaration of a beneficial interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases that is 
consistent with the Agreement." (Complaint ^f 25, 32.) Finally, the Complaint stated 
that the Appellants were entitled to a declaration of a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or 
sections and the cash settlement, both "consistent with the Agreement." (Complaint 
til 33-34.) 
8 
On August 7, 20025 Shaw and Del Rio moved for summary judgment. Shaw and 
Del Rio argued as follows: 
1. The 1995 Agreement did not convey any interests in the Oil Canyon Leases 
or the settlement proceeds to any of the Appellants. The 1995 Agreement purported only 
to require Shaw to use his "best efforts" to negotiate a funding agreement with the Federal 
Plaintiffs, and that agreement was supposed to convey interests to the Federal Plaintiffs. 
Thus, paragraphs 4, 4.1, and 4.2 amounted only to an "agreement to agree." (See Defs.' 
Dan K. Shaw and Del Rio Resources, Inc.'s Joint Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 
("Defs.' Mem."), R. 92-98.) 
2. The language of paragraphs 4 and 4.1 was too indefinite to support a claim 
by the Appellants that they were entitled to receive interests in the leases or the 
settlement. Because there were twenty-seven distinct individuals and entities who were 
"plaintiffs" in the Federal Litigation, ten separate leases at issue, and a number of 
different types of "beneficial interests" in any particular lease, it would be impossible for 
Appellants to show that they were entitled to receive any particular interest in any 
particular lease. (Defs.' Mem., R. 93-100.) 
3. The Oil Canyon Leases were not the "additional" leases referenced in the 
1995 Agreement. Because the Oil Canyon Leases were already in existence when the 
1995 Agreement was reached, and were already owned by several individuals and 
entities, it would not be reasonable to consider those leases as "additional" leases that 
Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs could divide among themselves. (Defs.1 Mem., R. 100-
02.) 
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Appellants filed their response on September 6, 2002. (Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' 
Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pls.? Mem."), R. 243-55.) Appellants disputed only a few of 
Defendants' proposed facts, and argued that (1) the 1995 Agreement was not unenforce-
able for indefiniteness, because any missing terms could be "'supplied by implication'" 
(id. at R. 248), and (2) that summary judgment should not be granted on the "additional 
leases" term because the term was ambiguous (kL at R. 252-54.). Additionally, 
Appellants filed an affidavit by their counsel pursuant to Rule 56(f) stating that he wished 
to depose Defendant Shaw and Mr. Gerald Nielson. (R. 256-59.) This affidavit did not 
explain why Appellants had not deposed Shaw or Nielson during the 13-plus months that 
the case had been pending up until that point. 
The hearing took place on October 28, 2002. (R. 279.) Even though it had been 
nearly three months since Shaw and Del Rio filed their motion, Appellants still had not 
deposed Shaw or Mr. Nielson. At the hearing, the trial court granted the summary 
judgment motion and ordered the claims against Shaw and Del Rio dismissed with 
prejudice, but granted Appellants leave to file an amended complaint to state a claim 
against Shaw for breach of the "best efforts" provision of paragraph 4 of the 1995 Agree-
ment. This order was formalized in writing on November 14, 2002. (Order and Summary 
Judgment, Add. Ex. 3, R. 288-89, ffl[ 1-2.) In the order, the trial court certified the 
judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). (IcL at R. 289.) Appellants appealed that ruling 
to this Court on December 13, 2002. 
On November 12, 2002, while the order was awaiting the trial court's signature, 
Appellants filed their amended complaint, which not only included a claim against Shaw 
10 
for breach of the best efforts provision, but also included a new claim against Del Rio, 
asserting for the very first time that they had. an interest in the Oil Canyon Leases as 
"joint v eiiti ire par ti lei s" v it! i Del R I :> It i tl i s de\ elopi nei it of "soi ne • :«: all of the propei ty 
that was subject to the [Federal] Litigation." (First Amended Complaint ^ 23, R. 283.) 
On November 14, 2002, Appellants filed a motion for leave to state this new claim 
against Del R io It i tl lis motioi i, i \ ppellai: its admitted that tl ic: >< delibei ately c *h i se i iot to 
pursue their joint venture theory sooner: 
A; ihe time ihis action was filed, plaintiffs did r**t think it n'tt\ 
necessary to stale such im because they thought their rights and 
interest were vicar from tlu ; w ^ Agreement. 
(Mem in Supp. of l\ loi, lor Leave to File 1 irst Amended Complaint, Add. Ex. 4, R. 292-
- \ (emphasis added).) Del Rio opposed the motion, pointing out that because Del Rio 
hcid already oceii dismissed ironi tne aciivi- \-.\ prejudice, i i :: • i icvv clain is con lid be stated 
again it - : asserted that, given Appellants' admission that they consciously 
chose to rely entirely on the 1995 Agreement originally; it would be improper to allow 
them to i.vid i\.:w theories alter tnai tneory pro\eu un ,a„cc, . • >;^ .. „* . . 
ti ial coi • denied \rnellants' motion for leave to amend, concluding that Appellants 
could not amend their complaint to state new claims against Del Rio after their original 
C-. ' i l l ] " ' i n J ' i - ...• ^ v, -1.11 v>;. u . i i ! - I' M M ; .^<a i \ \ , r - [ " ' n u i n : . >ii t i i t.*> i ip j " ' - < 
6
 Appellants separately appealed that ruling on April 24, 2003 (R. 357-58). but that 
appeal was subsequently dismissed. Moreover, on November 12. 2003. Appellants 
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice their remaining claims against Shaw (R. Af7-
58.) 
11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The case that the Appellants present before this Court is significantly different 
from the case they pleaded and argued below. Before the trial court, the Appellants 
unambiguously relied entirely on the 1995 Agreement as the source of their alleged rights 
in the Oil Canyon Leases. Now, however, Appellants admit that the 1995 Agreement 
does not grant them the rights they seek, and instead insist that their claims were actually 
based on other agreements, most importantly, a hypothetical litigation funding agreement 
that Shaw supposedly reached with one or more unnamed Federal Plaintiffs, that just may 
have granted one or more of the Appellants some rights in one or more of the Oil Canyon 
Leases. 
Appellants' new arguments are no more valid than their original ones. While 
Appellants deny that their claims below were based entirely on the 1995 Agreement, their 
own Complaint proves otherwise. Moreover, when Del Rio and Shaw moved for 
summary judgment below, Appellants did not rely on anything other than the 1995 
Agreement as the source of their purported rights in the Oil Canyon Leases. Thus, it is 
improper for Appellants to pursue new theories now. Instead, their claims are limited to 
the claims they made below, i.e., under the 1995 Agreement. 
And the 1995 Agreement clearly does not support Appellants' claims. First, and 
most importantly, the plain language of the 1995 Agreement shows that it does not grant 
any rights in the Oil Canyon Leases. Instead, the 1995 Agreement merely states that 
Shaw would enter into a subsequent funding agreement with the "plaintiffs" of the 
Federal Litigation, and that this subsequent funding agreement was supposed to grant 
12 
those "plaintiffs" interests in the Leases. Thus, any claim based on the 1995 Agreement 
fails as a matter of law, 
! ' . . " M J t : t : J I - ; i l U L M L I ' V ' ' ' \ L i l l 1 i H ! ! ! ! ! ; U • ; • • 
Appellants' claims. The 1995 Agreement posits that 11IV- percent of the "beneficial 
interests" in tl le "additional leases" \ \ ill ultimately be assigned to "plaintiffs [of the 
Feder.: ;;iLd;^ - "el;" ia. .cit-j^. so^ia- i\p.. • vu "iiiu:ie>b- v-
seven such plaintiffs. It is simply impossible for Appellants to establish that any one of 
them was supposed to receive any particular interest in any particular lease. In short, 
A p p e n d . . - *.-.... - aiL- I M N . : . .i -} - =-< •:-. 
Moreover, the 1995 Agreement states onl> that interests in "additional" leases 
might be assigned to the "plaintiffs," and the Oil Canyon Leases, which were in existence 
already , ai e i I : t ' additioi ial" leases. 1 1 le ii itei ests ii I tl le Oil Can\ on I eases w ere already 
owned by several individuals and entities who were not parties to the 1995 Agreement, 
and it would not be reasonable to conclude that the parties to the 1995 Agreement would 
purpoi I: to d/h ; ide amoi lg themselves i ights tl lat belonged to others. • . 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its ample discretion in rejecting Appellants' 
request under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for additional time to 
c . P ' . ^ . ! - c ( V n d : i ; X • • • = • ' v •: : ; ; , » . . . . , : * • 
summary judgment, the case had been pending for over a year, and an additional three 
months passed after the motion was filed before the hearing on the motion took place. 
Yet Appellants dr :1 i I : t i n 31 ' e to depos s Shaw or 1 i i slsc i :i, on: a n;\ one else, n : i I: lave tl i ^  ' 
explained why. Additionally, because the summary judgment motion was based on the 
13 
plain language of the 1995 Agreement, and other indisputable facts, the additional 
discovery Appellants purportedly sought would not have had an effect on the outcome of 
the motion. The Agreement says what it says, regardless of what discovery is done. 
Moreover, Appellants' argument that there might be a litigation funding agreement, and 
that the agreement might grant them some rights, is nothing but speculation, which does 
not compel relief under Rule 56(f). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS' CLAIMS FOR 
AN INTEREST IN THE OIL CANYON LEASES 
A. Appellants1 claims were based exclusively on the 1995 Agreement, not on 
Shaw's purported ''litigation funding agreement" or any other agreement. 
Appellants have apparently recognized, as Del Rio and Shaw argued below, that 
the 1995 Agreement did not grant, or even profess to grant, any "beneficial interests" in 
any of the Oil Canyon Leases. Therefore, Appellants have shifted their strategy on 
appeal, insisting instead that their claim to the leases is based on a "combination" of 
factors, and that the 1995 Agreement "is only the starting point, not the beginning and the 
end, of a proper analysis of Plaintiffs' claims." (Aplts.' Br. at 15, 18.) Essentially, 
Appellants argue that summary judgment was improper because they might have been 
granted lease interests in a "litigation funding agreement" that Shaw might have entered 
into with some of the plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation. (See, e.g., Aplts.1 Br. at 12.) 
The Court should summarily reject Appellants' eleventh-hour attempt to base their 
claims on anything other than the 1995 Agreement. Of course, Appellants cite no 
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evidence in the record suggesting that a funding agreement was ever reached with the 
Federal Plaintiffs, that the purported funding agreement granted interests in an} of the 
:ea^: . -1*};wi it . - ,iii,j. duie-.-niuiL LMI.U-. . ^. . i 
importantly; however, the Court need not even address the merits of the supposed 
"funding agreement," because Appellants never pursued any claims based on the 
trial court. 
1
 Appellants' Complaint was based entirely on the 1995 Agreement. 
Appendi . . • ., . ; *,. * \;>|'v.iiii;. . .iv^erim;; 
claims in the Oil Canyon Leases based solely on uie ;i/95 Agreement signed ^^  
themselves, Shaw, and Del Rio. (See Complaint. Add, Fv "• T>_ } ."M y] i e ,~irsl SCNCn 
p . i : AlA A \ J i - •: • ; • . i ' \',:AW l l K Ci : : ; ' .-. i f-. " i - * . i , i . : , > • | ' : i - -• * • . i \\ \ , • 
venue (*] 7). The Complaint then alleged as follows: 
The parties hereto arc parties to an "Agreement" dated May 12, 
1995, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto. 
2 he Agreement provides in pertinent part for the assignment; to 
Shaw, of interests in two federal oil and gas leases . . . and two state 
oil and gas leases 
2he Agreement also provides for the iuikimg. by hliaw. u: nugauon 
against the United States in which the parlies hereto. **v. !'.:rin[: 
Shaw, were plaintiffs . 
2 lie Agreement pro) ides that Shaw would "use his best efforts to 
enter into an agreement with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to provide 
a maximum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) to fund certain 
future expenses incurred by plaintiffs, in ^uch ligation." 
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12. The Agreement provides that with respect to the $305000 in 
litigation expenses, ff[n]o expenses shall be paid by Shaw directly to 
persons who are plaintiffs in the litigation or to affiliates of 
plaintiffs." 
13. The Agreement provides that ff[a]ny agreement between the 
plaintiffs and Shaw shall provide that if, as a result of the litigation, 
additional leases are awarded, such leases shall be assigned to Shaw 
(or his affiliates); provided, however, plaintiff [sic] shall be entitled 
to a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in such additional leases." 
14. Shaw did in fact fund the lawsuit pursuant to agreement with plain-
tiffs. 
15. The lawsuit was settled pursuant to the terms of a "Settlement 
Agreement," a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto. 
16. The Settlement Agreement provides in pertinent part for extension of 
the terms of 10 federal oil and gas leases, which do not include the 
two in the Agreement. 
19. Plaintiffs are entitled to a beneficial interest in the 10 leases 
according to the Agreement. 
25. Defendants in this case have proposed distribution of the settlement 
with the United States in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
Agreement. 
26. Specifically, defendants have denied plaintiffs Western United 
Mines, Inc., J.R. Kirk, Jr. and Steven D. Martens any interest in the 
10 federal oil and gas leases. 
27. Defendants have proposed a distribution of interest in the leases to 
plaintiff Syndicators, Inc., that is less than what is provided for by 
the Agreement. 
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32. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of a beneficial interest in ihc 10 
federal oil and gas leases that is consistent with the Agreement 
These passages from the C umpi^ m". demonstrate beyond doubt mm the Appellants' 
the entire Complaint where Appellants actually claim to be entitled to interests in the Oil 
Canyon Leases: paragraph h-. wii^ii diKMun^uhi;. u\er> dud Appellants are entuicu to 
Complaint also alleges that the Appellants are entitled to interests in 8 other tracts of land 
"according to the Agreement" and a portion ol ihc cash settlement "according to the 
Agreement " (Complah it Xj [ 22, 2/ 1 ) 1 1 le w rong that the defei idants allegedly committed 
according to the Complaint, was to ' P"-P.: el! distribution K)^ the settlement with the 
United States in a manner that is inconsistent wuh ihc . Igreemenf" m part by proposing 
a i ; - 1 , l • '•'l ' • ' • " ! i f V x M - ! » - • • - " ' ' [ - • ; • > : * / , ! * . ' / / . - . ' 
for by the Agreement." (Complaint ^ 25. 27.) Therefore, according to Appellants, they 
were entitled to a "declaration of beneficial interest" in I:K V Canyon Leases "consistent 
! villi ill l^/iYJHtf'HJ (( uinplan it n\\ 'i " i . . ' • . 
Every equitable or legal right must have a source. The only source claimed for the 
Appellants1 alleged rights in the Oil Canyon Leases was in,. 199:-' Agreement. In iact. 
Appellants admitted that they consciously chose to rch orh on ihc 1995 Agreement 
because "they though ineir ngiiis anu interest were clear i.ohi the .."• — Agreement." 
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Appellants further explained that they "thought that the 1995 Agreement clearly 
established their rights in the 10 oil and gas leases that are and have been the subject of 
this action. There would have been no need for the amendment if the unambiguous 
provisions of the Agreement had been enforced." (R. 333.)7 Accordingly, any attempt 
now by Appellants to assert that they have rights deriving from a different source should 
be rejected. See, e.g., Allisen v. American Legion Post 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 
1988) (refusing to consider appellant's common law negligence claim on appeal because 
complaint was brought only under Dram Shop Act); Davis v. Mulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 
475 P.2d 834, 834-35 (1970) ("Ordinarily an appellant cannot change his theory of the 
case on appeal from that presented to the court below."). 
2. Appellants did not assert rights under the funding agreement before 
the trial court. 
Further, in response to Del Rio's summary judgment motion, Appellants did not 
assert that they had any rights in the Oil Canyon Leases under the purported funding 
agreement that Appellants assert Shaw reached with the Federal Plaintiffs. Instead, 
Appellants argued only (1) that the 1995 Agreement was not too indefinite to enforce, 
because the missing terms could be "added by implication"; and (2) that the 1995 
n 
Indeed, it is significant that even Appellants' proposed amended complaint 
against Del Rio, filed after their original complaint was dismissed with prejudice, still did 
not assert any ownership interests in any of the Oil Canyon Leases under the purported 
funding agreement. Rather, the Amended Complaint attempted to claim rights pursuant 
to a purported joint venture among themselves and Del Rio. Thus, it is apparent that the 
Appellants did not even think of claiming any interests in the Oil Canyon Leases derived 
from the purported funding agreement until after they initiated their appeal. 
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Agreement was ambiguous with respect to whether the leases were "additional leases." 
(See Pis/ Oppo. Mem., R. 243-55.) 
the first time on apnea1 " Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah 1983). Thus. Ruie 4o of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly requires that a 
which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his 
grounds therefor,'1 I Jtah R Ci\ P 46 (emphasis added). The record must "clearly show 
div.i jiMc IS^L. : \y presL-nci • • - i 
ruling thereon." Busch Corp. \. State Farm i ire A: Cas. Co.. 743 P.2d 1217, 12i9 (Utah 
1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Franklin, 659 P.2d at 1045). Here, the Appellants never 
argueu i.: iru. :nai ,i.:nai_ JJULMUCHI --. :^ .n; ->,.: iviau^ \.w \:>|x-iiii> i^ 
were, or may have been, granted rights in the leases in the piirported funding agreement 
between Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs. Appellants are thus precluded from pursuing 
such an argumei it on appeal. 
Ji. The 1995 Agreement does not grant Appellants any definable or enforceable 
rights in any of the Oil Canyon Leases. 
1 Appellants have admitted that the 1995 Agreement does not grant 
them rights in the Oil Canyon Leases. 
Appellants admit in their brief that they are no longer claiming that the 1995 
Agreement grants them any rights in the Oil Canyon Leases: 
Appellants do not claim that the 1995 Agreement, in and of itself, grants 
them interests in the Oil Canyon Leases and the settlement cash proceeds. 
(Aplts.1 Br. at 15 (emphasis added).) By this admission, Appellants have conceded that 
the only theory they pursued in their Complaint, and the only theory they argued below is 
insufficient to support a judgment in their favor. Thus, the trial court's ruling dismissing 
Appellants' claims with prejudice should be affirmed, and the Court need not consider the 
matter any further. 
2. The 1995 Agreement, by its plain language, did not grant Appellants 
any rights in the Oil Canyon Leases. 
a. Paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement are too 
indefinite to be enforceable by Appellants. 
As established in the preceding section, Appellants' claim to an interest in the Oil 
Canyon Leases and the cash settlement was based entirely on paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the 
1995 Agreement. But as shown above, and as Appellants have admitted, these provisions 
did not grant Appellants any lease interests. Instead, paragraph 4 of the 1995 Agreement 
states that Shaw would use his "best efforts" to "enter into an agreement" with the Federal 
Plaintiffs to fund the Federal Litigation, and paragraph 4.1 states that the litigation 
funding agreement would provide that the Federal Plaintiffs would be entitled to an 
interest in any "additional leases" that were awarded as a result of the Federal Litigation. 
Thus, paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement were nothing more than an "agreement 
to agree" on a transfer and distribution of lease interests. Further, paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of 
the 1995 Agreement are too indefinite to be enforceable, because there are no guidelines 
for determining what interest any of the Federal Plaintiffs was supposed to receive under 
the contemplated funding agreement. Instead, the distribution of interests was left for 
subsequent determination. 
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For any alleged contract to be enforceable, "there must be a meeting of the minds 
of the parties which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient 
definitely Valcarce \ Bittei s, 12 I Jtal 1 2< i 51, 362 P.2d 1 2'/ , 428 
(1961) (emphasis added). Accordingly, '"agreements to agree' are generally unenforce-
able because they leave open material terms for future consideration, and the courts 
cannot create these terms |"i i ihe parlies, Harmon v. Greenwoou. .-/o * -
(Utah 1979) (emphasis added). 
Applying these principles, this Court has held that a lease option requiring the 
j >.:iu> ;•.• aiiice on .i ..: .• >, . cu. See Brown's Shoe f u \ . 
Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 362-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In BrmyiVs. the would-be tenant and 
the landlord signed an interim agreement providing for a three-year lease, with two option 
option periods; instead, the agreement stated that the parties "must agree on th«* iimss 
o 
volume figure from which to base additional rent" for the option period. The coin i held 
The Court noted that while an "agreement to agree" is not per se unenforceable, 
such an agreement may be enforced only when the terms of the final agreement are 
spciicu wui iii sufficient detail io ucmonstratc thai the parlies have actually a^recu on inc 
material terms: 
ihe rem in Brown's was made up of two components: a per-square-foot base 
rent, plus "additional rent." i.e.. a percentage of the plaintiffs sales above a certain gross-
volume threshold. The agreement in Brown's specified the base rent for the option 
period,, but the gross-volume ihre^h^lc4 for the additional rent was left undetermined. 
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[A] contract will not be prevented from ... operating by the mere fact that 
the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written 
memorial thereof. If all the conditions of the postponed writing are 
specified in such agreement, it is an agreement in praesenti, and as such 
becomes immediately enforceable. But where the conditions of the 
deferred contract are not set out in the provision one, or where 
material conditions are omitted, it is not a contract in praesenti because 
the minds of the parties have not met and may never meet 
Id at 363 (quoting Chu v. Ronstadt 498 P.2d 560, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)) (bold 
added; italics, brackets, and ellipses in original). The court further determined that 
because the price term was an essential element of the lease option agreement, the 
omission of such a term in the interim agreement rendered the agreement fatally 
defective. Id. at 364. 
The reasoning of Brown's applies in the present case and renders paragraphs 4 and 
4.1 of the 1995 Agreement unenforceable. Paragraphs 4 and 4.1 contemplate that Shaw 
and the Federal Plaintiffs would enter into a subsequent agreement that would provide 
Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs each with fifty percent of the beneficial interests in any 
additional leases awarded through the Federal Litigation. However, paragraphs 4 and 4.1 
provide no guidelines to determine which of the twenty-seven Federal Plaintiffs was 
supposed to enter into the subsequent agreement with Shaw, what type of interest (i.e., 
record title, working interest, overriding royalty) was to be assigned, or the extent of each 
type of interest any of the Federal Plaintiffs was to have received. 
For example, paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement do not specify whether 
all twenty-seven Federal Plaintiffs were going to receive equal interests9 or unequal 
9
 This option would give each of the Federal Plaintiffs a 1.85% interest in the 
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interests. Also, assuming that the Federal Plaintiffs were not going to receive identical 
interests, the 1995 Agreement does not indicate what interest each of the Federal Plain-
tiffs was to receive or how such interests were to be calculated. The 1995 Agreement 
also does not specify whether each Federal Plaintiff was to receive an interest in each of 
the ten leases, or whether leases would be apportioned among different groups of persons 
(e.g., a particular person or entity may have an interest in one lease but no interest in any 
of the other nine). The 1995 Agreement does not even specify whether all of the Federal 
Plaintiffs were supposed to receive lease interests, or only some of them, or if so, which 
ones. Finally, there are several different types of "interests" possible in an oil and gas 
lease, including cost-bearing interests (working interests, back-in interests), non-cost 
bearing interests (overriding royalty interests, net profits interests), and carried interests. 
See generally 8 William & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, Manual of Terms (2001). But the 
1995 Agreement does not specify what type of interest any of the Federal Plaintiffs would 
have agreed to accept. 
Was Syndicators supposed to receive a ten percent record title interest in lease U-
6610 and a fifteen percent working receipts interest in lease U-10162, or the other way 
around? Was Western supposed to receive a net profits interest or a working interest? 
Was Martens, Syndicators' president, supposed to receive interests in addition to the ones 
that Syndicators was to receive? Was Mono Power Company, a non-party to this action, 
going to give up all of its interests in all of the leases? Some of its interests in some of 
leases (50% divided by 27). 
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the leases? These are just a few of the questions that the 1995 Agreement does not 
answer.10 
Indeed, the Appellants' position in the present case is even weaker than the tenant's 
position in Brown's, because the 1995 Agreement did not even require Shaw and the 
Federal Plaintiffs to actually "agree" on funding for the Federal Litigation; instead, Shaw 
was asked only to "use his best efforts to enter into an agreement with the plaintiffs of 
such [Federal] lawsuit." (1995 Agreement, Add. Ex. 1, \ 4 (emphasis added).) The "best 
efforts" provision adds another layer of indefiniteness to the 1995 Agreement, as a best 
efforts agreement is unenforceable unless the agreement includes a "clear set of guide-
lines against which the parties' 'best efforts' may be measured." Pinnacle Books v. 
Harlequin Enters. Ltd., 519 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also GLS Dev't v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, 944 F. Supp. 1384, 1392 (N.D. 111. 1996) (agreement in which 
developer agreed to use "best efforts" to locate another location was too indefinite to be 
enforceable). As set forth above, the 1995 Agreement provides no way to determine 
what, if any, interest any of the parties was supposed to receive in the new leases. 
Appellants' position is also weaker than the tenant's position in Brown's because 
paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement purportedly require Shaw to reach an agree-
ment with the twenty or so Federal Plaintiffs who were not even parties to the 1995 
Agreement. In Brown's, the landlord and tenant were both parties to the interim lease 
10
 Indeed, Appellants are wrong when they assert that Defendants "cannot, and do 
not, contend that the term 'beneficial interest' is vague." (Aplts.' Br. at 28.) To the 
contrary, "beneficial interest" was not defined in the 1995 Agreement; instead, it was left 
to be negotiated at a later date. 
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agreement that required them to agree on the rental rate for the option periods. It was 
thus at least plausible to argue that by binding themselves to reach a further agreement, 
they made a commitment that was definite enough to be enforceable. In the present case, 
however, it is not plausible to suggest that any of the parties to the 1995 Agreement (i.e., 
Kirk, Martens, Syndicators, Western, Caldwell, or Del Rio) had the authority to bind the 
other Federal Plaintiffs to reach an agreement with Shaw.11 
Further, for any of the Appellants to establish a right to a certain interest in a lease, 
he or it would have to establish that the other Federal Plaintiffs were bound to agree not 
to claim that interest. For example, if Kirk and Martens were to contend that they were 
entitled to a forty percent interest in the additional leases, they would have to establish 
that the other Federal Plaintiffs agreed or would have agreed to accept interests adding up 
to only ten percent. It would be ludicrous for the Appellants to suggest that the 1995 
Agreement, upon which their claims are based, binds the Federal Plaintiffs to accept a 
certain percentage of the interests from any "additional leases" to be awarded through the 
Federal Litigation. 
Significantly, Appellants have known all along that paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the 
1995 Agreement are too indefinite to be enforceable. As explained in the Statement of 
11
 Appellants are missing the point when they argue that the 1995 Agreement was 
a complete agreement. (Aplts.f Br. at 21.) Del Rio and Shaw do not contend that the 
1995 Agreement as a whole is not an integrated agreement. Rather, it is paragraphs 4 and 
4.1 of the 1995 Agreement that are unenforceable, insofar as Appellants claim that these 
paragraphs entitle Appellants to rights in the Oil Canyon Leases. 
12
 In fact, Kirk and Martens have demanded that they and their companies be given 
the entire fifty percent interest that was supposed to be assigned to the Federal Plaintiffs. 
Thus, Kirk and Martens are essentially contending that the other 23 Federal Plaintiffs 
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Facts, Appellants were informed by their counsel both that paragraph 4 was "an 
unenforceable 'agreement to agree'" and that paragraph 4.1 could not be implimented 
"inasmuch as all of the plaintiffs in the litigation are not parties to this agreement." (See 
R. 211.) Thus, Appellants knew that the 1995 Agreement provided them with no interest 
in any leases that might have been awarded through the Federal Litigation, but Appellants 
went ahead and executed the Agreement anyway. This demonstrates that Appellants con-
cluded that the consideration they received in the 1995 Agreement, i.e., Shaw's agreement 
to forgive nearly $800,000 in debt, was a fair return in exchange for the consideration 
they gave Shaw under the 1995 Agreement (assigning lease interests that had already 
been pledged as security for the debt). Granting the Appellants interests in the Oil 
Canyon Leases would therefore be giving the Appellants more than they agreed to accept 
(and Shaw and Del Rio agreed to grant) in the 1995 Agreement. This Court should not 
step in and give Appellants a better deal than they were able to reach for themselves. 
b. For similar reasons, it would be pure speculation for 
Appellants to claim that the 1995 Agreement entitles 
them to any particular interest in any particular leases. 
Further, even if paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the Agreement were enforceable in the 
abstract, Appellants would still have no valid claim to any interest in the leases, because 
there is no way Appellants can prove that they were supposed to receive any of the 
interests in the additional leases that were supposed to be assigned pursuant to the 
funding agreement. As explained in the preceding section, paragraph 4.1 did not specify 
how the fifty percent interest in the additional leases was supposed to be distributed 
agreed or would have agreed to give up all of their interests. 
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among the Federal Plaintiffs. And, even more importantly, there is nothing in the 1995 
Agreement specifying that any of the Appellants in this action, i.e., Kirk, Martens, 
Syndicators, or Western, would be among the Federal Plaintiffs receiving interests in the 
leases. Thus, it is entirely possible that the entire fifty percent interest would have been 
allocated to one or more of the twenty-three Federal Plaintiffs who are not among the 
Appellants. 
For example, under the terms of paragraph 4.1 of the Agreement, the funding 
agreement between Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs could have assigned twenty-five per-
cent interests each to Hiko Bell Mining & Oil Company and Mono Power Company, two 
of the other Federal Plaintiffs. Such an assignment would have satisfied paragraph 4.1's 
requirement that fifty percent of the interests be awarded to the Federal Plaintiffs, while 
leaving no interests for Kirk, Martens, Syndicators, or Western. Notably, in claiming that 
Shaw did in fact enter into a "funding agreement," Appellants posited that the funding 
agreement may have been between Shaw and Del Rio as the "lead plaintiff." (Aplts.? Br. 
at 29.) But if an agreement by Shaw with Del Rio would satisfy paragraph 4's 
requirement of an agreement "with the plaintiffs of such [federal] lawsuit," then an 
assignment of the leasehold interests to Del Rio would satisfy paragraph 4.1's requirement 
that "plaintiffs" receive a fifty percent interest in the additional leases. (1995 Agreement 
Tffl4, Add. Ex. 2, 4.1.) In other words, Shaw could have entered into an agreement to 
assign fifty percent of the leasehold interests to Del Rio alone, which would have satisfied 
paragraph 4.1, and Appellants still would not have any rights in any of the leases. 
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Notably, Appellants presented no evidence below regarding the negotiation of the 
1995 Agreement, or of their understanding of the meaning of paragraphs 4 and 4.1. 
Appellants requested additional time under Rule 56(f) to depose Shaw and Gerald Niel-
son, but the Appellants themselves were parties to the 1995 Agreement, and there was 
certainly nothing preventing Appellants from filing affidavits presenting their own 
testimony. Therefore, if Appellants had any understanding or belief that a subsequent 
funding agreement between Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs was going to provide them 
with any specific interests in any specific leases, they could have presented evidence of 
such an understanding below. They did not present such evidence, which suggests that 
they had no such an understanding. Their silence on this matter speaks volumes. 
There are countless ways in which the fifty percent "beneficial" interest could have 
been divided among only the twenty-three Federal Plaintiffs who were not plaintiffs in 
this action. Each of these possible distributions would have satisfied paragraph 4.1, but 
each would have resulted in no interests going to any of the Appellants. Consequently, 
any ruling that any of the Appellants is entitled to a particular interest in a particular lease 
would be nothing more than rank speculation. 
The reasoning of a recent Utah Supreme Court decision is instructive in this 
regard. See Carter v. Sorenson, 2004 UT 33, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 WL 834216 
(April 20, 2004). In Carter, the defendant agreed that if he bought the plaintiffs ranch 
property at a foreclosure sale, he would grant the plaintiff an option to buy the property at 
the same price that he paid. IdL ^ 2. The defendant bought the ranch for an appraised 
price of $355,000, and the plaintiff attempted to buy a portion of the property, the 
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appurtenant water shares. Id. Iflj 3-4. When the parties could not agree on a price for the 
water shares, the plaintiff deposited a sum of money in escrow and sued to obtain the 
shares. The Supreme Court upheld summary judgment for the defendant, concluding that 
because the parties' agreement did not set forth a price for any particular portion of the 
property, the option lacked a price term and was therefore unenforceable. Id. ^j 7-11. 
The court noted that even though the parties "clearly intended to create an 
enforceable option agreement allowing Carter to buy back all or part of his farm from 
Sorenson," they "failed to do so because they did not include an identifiable price term for 
a purchase of less than the entire property." Id. j^ 8. The court also reasoned that "what is 
left is the sole fact that Sorenson paid $355,000 for the entire property. There exists no 
mechanism for determining what price Sorenson paid for any fraction of the property." 
Id. Tj 11. The court concluded that "[t]he legal consequence of a missing price term is the 
unenforceability of the agreement." Id. 
The reasoning of Carter applies here. Just as in Carter, the 1995 Agreement 
specifies the total interest that was supposed to be allocated to the Federal Plaintiffs in the 
funding agreement Shaw was to reach: fifty percent of any "additional leases." But just 
as in Carter, "there exists no mechanism" for determining what fraction of this interest 
was supposed to be allocated to any or all of the Appellants. Thus, as in Carter, the 
consequence of the failure of the 1995 Agreement to specify what interests the Appellants 
were supposed to receive is the unenforceability of the agreement by the Appellants. 
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c. Because of the fundamental indefiniteness of the 1995 
Agreement, Appellants' attempts to raise a triable issue 
of fact are unavailing. 
Because the 1995 Agreement provides no guidance as to what, if any, interests 
were to be assigned to which Plaintiff, the judgment should be affirmed, notwithstanding 
Appellants' arguments on appeal. For example, in their "basic contentions" section, 
Appellants assert that "they are entitled to a distribution of the Federal Litigation Settle-
ment Res in accordance with the formula set forth in the 1995 Agreement." (Aplts.' Br. 
at 12 (emphasis added).) But Del Rio and Shaw's whole point is that there was no 
"formula" set forth in the 1995 Agreement — only that fifty percent of the various cost-
bearing and non-cost-bearing interests in the ten Oil Canyon Leases were somehow to be 
allocated among some or all of the twenty-seven Federal Plaintiffs. Similarly, Appellants 
contend that because Shaw ended up paying for some litigation expenses, the Court can 
"infer[] that the funding agreement was entered into pursuant to, and contained the terms 
required by, the 1995 Agreement." (Aplts.' Br. at 16 (emphasis added).) Appellants also 
assert that "there is no reason to believe that [Shaw] provided the funding on any terms 
other than the terms required by the 1995 Agreement" (Aplts.' Br. at 22.) Once again, 
however, the only "terms" required by the 1995 Agreement are too indefinite for 
Appellants to rely on. Appellants also argue that the 1995 Agreement was not an 
"agreement to agree" because "the parties have concluded their discussions and have 
reached agreement on all material terms." (Aplts.' Br. at 19 (emphasis added).) Again, 
no agreement was reached on fundamental terms like who was going to get what interests 
in which leases. 
30 
Attempting to avoid this problem, Appellants surprisingly argue that "[t]he interest 
of the Federal Litigation plaintiffs were specified in the pleadings in the Federal Litiga-
tion," and that whatever interests "a party" received "as a result of the litigation" would be 
assigned one hundred percent to Shaw, with Shaw then assigning fifty percent of that 
interest back to the "party." (See Aplts.1 Br. at 30.) Thus, applying this formula to 
Appellants1 own claims, Appellants appear to contend that under the 1995 Agreement, 
they are entitled to exactly fifty percent of the interests they held at the start of the Federal 
Litigation. So because Plaintiff Steven Martens originally had a right to receive 1.32% of 
all payments received from the sale of oil and gas generated from Oil Canyon wells (R. 
147), Martens now apparently has a right to receive 0.66% of all such payments, under 
the 1995 Agreement, with the other 0.66% being assigned to Shaw. 
This argument does not really help Appellants. First, they never raised this con-
tention below. That is, they never claimed that the interests they were to receive pursuant 
to the 1995 Agreement could be determined by reference to the interests they held during 
the Federal Litigation, or that those interests would be exactly half of the interests they 
originally held. If they had, this case never would have been filed, because Defendants 
have always recognized the record title, working, and royalty ownership interests that 
existed in the Oil Canyon Leases when the Federal Litigation began. As Del Rio 
explained to the trial court (and as Appellants never denied), Appellants have been 
demanding that they receive fifty percent of all the interests in the Oil Canyon Leases, not 
just fifty percent of what they held previously. Appellants have apparently adopted this 
argument now, to try to salvage something from this case, but it is simply too late. 
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Because nothing in the 1995 Agreement, or elsewhere in the record, suggests that 
the Appellants would receive any specific rights in any specific leases, Appellants' "con-
dition precedent" argument fails as well. (Aplts.' Br. at 19.) Appellants attempt to 
characterize the requirement that Shaw use his "best efforts'' to reach a funding agreement 
with the Federal Plaintiffs to be nothing more than a "condition precedent." Appellants 
further claim that because it can be "inferred" that Shaw entered into such an agreement, 
the Appellants are therefore entitled to interests in the leases. But this argument misses 
two critical steps. First, Appellants' argument is contradicted by the plain language of the 
1995 Agreement itself. The 1995 Agreement does not state that the Appellants (or the 
Federal Plaintiffs) would automatically receive a fifty percent interest in the leases simply 
if a funding agreement were reached. Thus, a funding agreement was not merely a 
condition precedent to the vesting of the lease interests. Rather, the 1995 Agreement is 
unmistakably clear that it was a subsequent agreement, i.e., the funding agreement, that 
was to provide for the assignment of any interests in any "additional" leases. 
Second, even if reaching a funding agreement were just a condition precedent, the 
indefiniteness of paragraph 4.1 would still defeat Appellants' claim. Even if interests in 
the leases were to automatically vest in the Federal Plaintiffs when Shaw entered into a 
Of course, Del Rio and Shaw do not concede that such an agreement may be 
inferred. Shaw specifically testified in his affidavit that he did not reach a funding 
agreement with the federal plaintiffs (R. 173-74), and no evidence was submitted to 
controvert his testimony. Therefore, it is established as a matter of law that Shaw did not 
reach such an agreement. But as explained in the text, this issue ultimately does not 
matter for purposes of the appeal, because regardless of whether it can be inferred that 
Shaw actually entered into a funding agreement, there is still no basis for Appellants' 
claim that they are entitled to any specific rights in any specific leases. 
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funding agreement, there is still no basis to determine that any interests were to vest in 
Kirkj Martens, Western, or Syndicators. Thus, because there is no basis for any claim by 
the Appellants that they are entitled to any particular interest, they cannot claim to have 
been deprived of any particular interest.14 
Indeed, many of Appellants' arguments conflate the issues of (1) whether 
Appellants have a claim for declaration of an interest in the Oil Canyon Leases; and 
(2) whether Appellants have a claim for breach of the best efforts provision. Only the 
former issue is before the Court on this appeal. Thus, even if Appellants were correct that 
the 1995 Agreement is "enforceable," in that Shaw was legally obligated to use his best 
efforts to reach a funding agreement with the Federal Plaintiffs, that would not help them 
on this appeal. If Shaw undertook an enforceable obligation to use his best efforts to 
enter into a litigation funding agreement along certain terms, and if Shaw breached this 
The Court should not be misled by Appellants' reliance on Utah Golf Associa-
tion v. City of North Salt Lake, 2003 UT 38, 79 P.3d 919, because that case has abso-
lutely no bearing on the present case. Utah Golf involved a complex land transaction 
between the Golf Association and North Salt Lake City. As part of this transaction, the 
parties agreed that the Association would receive the proceeds of a sale of a piece of 
property if the Association entered into a twenty-year lease with the City. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that the twenty-year lease provision was a condition precedent, and 
not an agreement to agree, because the agreement "did not purport to obligate either party 
to enter into a twenty-year lease." Id, ^ 14. Instead, the agreement merely provided what 
would happen //such a lease was agreed upon. Id. 
The situation in the present case is precisely the opposite. That is, the 1995 
Agreement does purport to require Shaw to use his "best efforts" to enter into a funding 
agreement, rather than making such efforts optional. However, the 1995 Agreement does 
not provide that any rights would accrue if such efforts are used or such an agreement is 
reached. Instead, the determination of precisely what leasehold interests would accrue, 
and to whom, was left to the funding agreement itself. 
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obligation, and if Appellants could somehow establish damages,15 then Appellants might 
have a claim against Shaw for breach of contract. The trial court authorized Appellants to 
amend their complaint to state such a claim, and the Appellants did so.16 But even if 
there were a basis for such a claim against Shaw, that would not support a claim by these 
Appellants for interests in the Oil Canyon Leases. 
Finally, and for similar reasons, Appellants' repeated assertion that it can be 
"inferred" that Shaw reached a funding agreement is another red herring. It ultimately 
does not matter whether Shaw reached a funding agreement, because Appellants cannot 
show that Shaw's reaching an agreement would entitle any of the Appellants to an interest 
in any of the Oil Canyon Leases. 
Any argument Appellants pursue will ultimately run up against the inescapable 
truth that even if the 1995 Agreement granted, or required Del Rio or Shaw to grant, 
interests in the Oil Canyon Leases to the "plaintiffs of such [federal] litigation," Kirk, 
Martens, Western, and Syndicators would not necessarily have received any interests in 
the leases. The bottom line is that the 1995 Agreement simply does not, directly or 
indirectly, grant Appellants any interests in the Oil Canyon Leases, and Appellants cannot 
make it do so. 
15
 Of course, because it would be pure speculation for any of the Appellants to 
assert that he or it would have received "X" interest in "Y" lease, any claim for damages 
would be purely speculative as well. 
16
 Appellants, however, did nothing to pursue this claim since the Amended 
Complaint was filed with the trial court in November 2002, and the claim was ultimately 
dismissed without prejudice in November 2003. 
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d. The Oil Canyon Leases, as a matter of law, cannot 
reasonably be the "additional leases" referenced in the 
1995 Agreement. 
Appellants also have no interests in the Oil Canyon Leases because as a matter of 
law, those leases are not the "additional leases" contemplated by paragraph 4.1 of the 
1995 Agreement. Instead, the term "additional leases" can only refer to leases that may 
have been awarded in addition to the leases that the Federal Plaintiffs already held and 
on which the litigation focused. No such additional leases were awarded, so Appellants' 
claims fail on this basis as well. 
When the Federal Litigation began, some of the Federal Plaintiffs, including Plain-
tiff Syndicators, already held record title interests in some of the Oil Canyon Leases. The 
Settlement Agreement terminating the Federal Litigation merely provided that the terms 
of those leases were "tolled" during the litigation and "extended" for three years after the 
Federal Litigation was dismissed. (Settlement Agreement, R. 159-60.) No new leases 
were awarded. Thus, there are no "additional leases" in which Appellants can claim an 
interest. 
It would be completely unreasonable for the term "additional leases" in paragraph 
4.1 of the 1995 Agreement to refer to the ten Oil Canyon Leases already at issue in the 
Federal Litigation. First, it defies logic to use the term "additional" to refer to leases 
already in existence. More importantly, however, of the parties to the 1995 Agreement, 
only Syndicators and Del Rio's subsidiary Del-Rio Drilling owned record title interests in 
the Oil Canyon Leases. The majority of interests in most of the Oil Canyon Leases was 
owned by third parties. For example, nonparty Dalen Resources (successor to Natural 
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Gas Corporation of California) owned record title and operating rights interests in leases 
U-6610, 6612, 6632, 6634, 10165, and 18726; nonparties Joan and Raymond Chorney 
owned record title and operating rights interests in leases U-6610, 6612, 6632, 6634, and 
10165; and nonparty Exxon Corporation owned record title and operating rights interests 
in lease U-10165. (R. 167.) Finally, Gerald Nielson, the attorney representing the 
plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation, was and is entitled to a 25% interest in the Oil Canyon 
Leases as compensation for his representation. It would be, therefore, impossible for 
Shaw, Del Rio, and the Appellants to carry out an agreement to assign to themselves 
interests to leases owned by others. 
Utah law is clear that if a contract has only one reasonable interpretation, then the 
interpretation of that contract is a matter of law for the court. E.g., Orlob v. Wasatch 
Management 2001 UT App 287, f^ 12, 33 P.3d 1078. Appellants' proposed interpretation 
of the "additional leases" term in paragraph 4.1 ~ that the term refers to the ten already-
existing Oil Canyon Leases — would mean that the parties to the 1995 Agreement were 
agreeing to divide among themselves leases with significant interests owned by third 
parties. Such an interpretation is simply unreasonable as a matter of law; the only 
reasonable interpretation is that "additional" leases referred to other leases - leases that 
1 7 
were not yet in existence or were not already owned by the parties and others. 
Accordingly, Appellants as a matter of law cannot prevail on their claim for an interest in 
the Federal Leases under the 1995 Agreement. 
1 7 
Indeed, Appellants' Complaint expressly referred to a "proposal that 8 tracts or 
sections of land be offered for lease." (Complaint f^ 20.) 
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Appellants' arguments on this point can be rejected, because, at bottom it is simply 
not reasonable to conclude that the Oil Canyon Leases, which were already in existence 
and merely extended by the Settlement Agreement, constituted "additional" leases. 
Appellants attempt to argue that when the 1995 Agreement was reached, the parties had 
an "understanding" that the Oil Canyon Leases had expired, but Appellants cite no 
evidence that anyone actually had this understanding. Once again, while Appellants 
asserted that they needed additional time to depose Shaw and Gerald Nielson, there was 
nothing preventing Appellants from submitting affidavits from Kirk or Martens, if in fact 
either of them actually was operating under the so-called understanding that Appellants 
now claim. 
Similarly, the record below defeats Appellants' attempt to dispute Mr. Nielson's 
claim to a 25 percent interest in the Oil Canyon Leases. Appellants appear to suggest that 
Mr. Nielson's claim is in doubt because the contingency fee agreement was not actually 
filed below, but this argument is specious. Most importantly, Appellants conceded below 
that Mr. Nielson had a twenty-five percent interest in the leases. Paragraph 11 of Del 
Rio's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts asserted that "as of the date of the 1995 
Agreement, Gerald Niels[o]n, the attorney representing the plaintiffs in the Federal Liti-
gation, was entitled to a 25% interest in the leases and wells drilled on the land covered 
by the leases as compensation for the representation." (R. 90.) In response, Appellants 
conceded that "no genuine issue exists as to the facts stated in f^ 11." (R. 245.) Thus, the 
fact that Mr. Nielson has a twenty-five percent interest in the Oil Canyon Leases is 
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"deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment." CJA 4-501(2)(B) (repealed 
eff. Nov. 1, 2003; now at Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A)).18 
A party wishing to oppose a motion for summary judgment must present evidence 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact; he or she may not merely rest on plead-
ings or speculate that some evidence may be found that might defeat the moving party's 
motion. Appellants bore the burden of establishing their claims. Thus, Appellants were 
obligated to present evidence supporting those claims. See, e.g., Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 
944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (citations and internal punctuation omitted) ("Put another 
way, once the moving party has brought forth evidence either tending to prove a lack of 
genuine issue of material fact or challenging the existence of one of the elements of the 
cause of action, the nonmoving party then bears the burden of providing some evidence, 
by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the essential elements of his or her claim."). In the 
present case, Appellants were required to present evidence below that the term "additional 
leases" in the 1995 Agreement could reasonably mean the Oil Canyon Leases. Appellants 
failed to do so. Accordingly, the summary judgment can be upheld on this ground as 
well. 
Additionally, Appellants' attempt to raise questions concerning Mr. Nielson's 
interest, simply because Del Rio did not submit a copy of the contingency fee agreement 
for the public record, is specious. Mr. Nielson obviously has personal knowledge of the 
terms of his own agreement with the Federal Plaintiffs, and his affidavit testimony, which 
Appellants never moved to strike, is therefore competent evidence that such an agreement 
existed. And that evidence was never controverted. 
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C. The trial court acted within its discretion in denying Appellants' request for 
additional discovery time under Rule 56(f). 
Finally, the Court can reject Appellants' claim that the summary judgment should 
be reversed because the Appellants were entitled to additional discovery time under Rule 
56(f). This Court has explained that a Rule 56(f) request will not be granted where the 
request is "dilatory or lacking in merit." E.g., Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 
482, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992). 
Moreover, a Rule 56(f) request will not be granted where the party seeking the delay is 
merely on a "fishing expedition" for "purely speculative facts." Id at 489 (quoting 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). A trial court 
has substantial discretion to consider and rule on a 56(f) request; this Court has explained 
that it "will not reverse [a] trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion unless the decision 
exceeds the limits of reasonability " Holmes v. American States Ins. Co., 2000 UT App 
85, f 26, 1 P.3d 552 (emphasis added) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). 
Appellants have not established that the trial court's denial of their 56(f) request 
"exceed[ed] the limits of reasonability." First, Appellants had ample opportunity to 
depose Shaw, Nielson, and anyone else they wanted before the trial court granted 
summary judgment. Second, as Appellants' brief illustrates, the discovery they sought 
was nothing more than a fishing expedition, and it is pure speculation for Appellants to 
suggest that this discovery would have yielded any information supporting their claims. 
Appellants clearly had plenty of time to depose Shaw and Nielson. Appellants 
filed their complaint in July 2001, and Del Rio and Shaw did not move for summary 
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judgment until August 7, 2002, a full year later. Appellants have failed to explain why 
they did not depose Shaw or Nielson during that year. Moreover, the hearing on the 
summary judgment motion did not take place until October 28, 2002, almost three 
months after Del Rio and Shaw filed it. Appellants assert in a footnote that the summary 
judgment motion "moved rapidly to decision" (Aplts.' Br. at 37 n.30), but this is simply 
wrong: there is absolutely no reason why Appellants could not have deposed Shaw or 
Nielson before the October 28 hearing. Thus, given Appellants' failure to take advantage 
of the ample opportunity they had to depose Shaw and Nielson, the trial court was not 
required to grant them additional time under Rule 56(f).19 
Moreover, the discovery that Appellants wanted to pursue would not have affected 
the outcome of the motion. As shown above, Appellants' claim for a declaration of 
interests in the Oil Canyon Leases fails as a matter of law because the 1995 Agreement 
simply does not grant any such interests, and because the Appellants' provision cannot 
show that they were supposed to receive any particular interests in any particular leases. 
These conclusions are based on the plain language of the 1995 Agreement, plus the 
undisputed facts that (1) the Oil Canyon Leases included ten different leases, and (2) 
there were twenty-seven "plaintiffs" to whom the beneficial interests were supposed to be 
allocated. All the discovery in the world is not going to change any of these facts. As 
such, the trial court was well within its discretion in concluding that there was no point in 
delaying a ruling to allow discovery. See, e.g., Holmes, 2000 UT App 85 at f^ 26, 1 P.3d 
19
 Indeed, Appellants did not even depose Shaw during the additional year that 
their claim against him for breach of the "best efforts" provision remained pending before 
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at 558 (upholding denial of 56(f) request: "Because appellant's claims fail as a matter of 
law, there was no need to allow further discovery."). 
Perhaps recognizing this problem, Appellants argue that it was necessary for them 
to depose Shaw and Nielson so they could "discover ... the rest of the story concerning 
this mysterious funding agreement." (Aplts.' Br. at 38.) But this is just a fishing 
expedition. Appellants have cited nothing in the record suggesting that there is any 
"story" about the "mysterious" funding agreement, or that learning more about this 
supposed story would support a judgment in their favor on their claims for an interest in 
any of the Oil Canyon Leases. 
A party seeking Rule 56(f) relief "may not simply rely on vague assertions that 
additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts." Simmons Oil Corp. v. 
Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 86 F.3d 1138, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1996). "It is not enough simply to 
assert, a la Wilkins Micawber, that 'something will turn up.f" Id, Moreover, "[t]he burden 
is on the party seeking to conduct additional discovery to put forth sufficient facts to 
show that the evidence exists." Conkle v. Jeong, 73 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1995). At 
best, Appellants appear to be arguing that if they deposed Shaw and Nielson, they might 
be able to uncover evidence that Shaw entered into a litigation funding agreement with 
one or more of the Federal Plaintiffs, and that this agreement might have granted 
the trial court. 
Appellants' brief also discusses supposed "facts" that Appellants purportedly 
"later discovered" concerning Shaw's alleged purchase of stock in Del Rio and a supposed 
joint venture between Shaw and non-party Wind River Resources Corporation, but there 
is absolutely no evidence in the record, or elsewhere, supporting Appellants' allegations 
regarding these matters. (See Aplts.' Br. at 38.) 
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Appellants interests in some of the Oil Canyon Leases. But this, once again, is pure 
speculation, as the Appellants have presented no evidence suggesting either that the 
hypothetical funding agreement was reached, or that the agreement granted them any 
interests. 
Obviously, none of the Appellants were parties to this hypothetical litigation 
funding agreement. If any of the Appellants was a party to that agreement, Appellants 
would have submitted an affidavit to that effect, and they did not do so. Thus, Appellants' 
entire claim is based on the hypothesis that they are third party beneficiaries, of an 
agreement of which they have no evidence. 
Of course, Appellants did not plead, or argue below, any claims as third-party 
beneficiaries. Moreover, to prevail on a third-party beneficiary claim, Appellants would 
have to prove that Shaw and one or more unnamed Federal Plaintiffs entered into an 
agreement, and that the "clear intent" of those parties was to confer a benefit on the 
Appellants by assigning them interests in the Oil Canyon Leases. See, e.g., Miller v. 
Martineau & Co., 1999 UT App 216, ^ 37, 983 P.2d 1107, 1114 ("The intent of the 
contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be clear."). Given that 
there is no evidence that such an agreement even exists, there would be no basis for 
Appellants to contend that discovery into this hypothetical agreement would have 
revealed a "clear" intent to confer benefits on Appellants by assigning Appellants 
interests in the leases.21 
Indeed, the language of paragraphs 4 and 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement defeat 
Appellants' suggestion that a funding agreement between Shaw would have granted them 
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Once again, to prevail on this issue on appeal, Appellants have to demonstrate that 
it "exceeded the limits of reasonability" for the trial court to deny their 56(f) request. 
Appellants must establish that the trial court was obligated to let them conduct additional 
discovery, discovery that Appellants chose not to undertake during the first fifteen months 
the case was pending, in pursuit of a claim that Appellants did not plead, based on a 
theory of the case that was unsupported by any evidence. Obviously, Appellants have not 
established that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 56(f) request, and as 
such the dismissal of Appellants1 claims for a declaration of an interest in the Oil Canyon 
Leases. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS* CLAIMS FOR 
AN INTEREST IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS 
For largely the same reasons, the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
dismissing Appellants' claims for a share of the $300,000 in cash that was obtained in 
settlement of the Federal Litigation. Once again, Appellants based their claim for the 
any rights in the Oil Canyon Leases. Paragraph 4 says that Shaw was to use his best 
efforts to enter into an agreement with "the plaintiffs of such [federal] lawsuit" to fund 
certain expenses "incurred by plaintiffs in such litigation." (1995 Agreement, Add. Ex. 2, 
hereto, TJ4.) Paragraph 4.1 said that any agreement between the "plaintiffs" and Shaw 
was to provide that the "plaintiffs" would be entitled to a fifty percent beneficial interest 
in the additional leases. (Id. j^ 4.1.) In other words, the 1995 Agreement used the same 
term to refer both to the persons with whom Shaw was to reach the funding agreement 
and to the persons who were to receive interests in the leases. Therefore, the 1995 
Agreement clearly contemplated that the persons who entered into the funding agreement 
with Shaw would be the ones receiving interests in the leases. The Appellants obviously 
did not enter into a funding agreement with Shaw. Therefore, there is no reason to 
believe that the persons who did enter into a funding agreement with Shaw (and again, 
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settlement proceeds entirely on the 1995 Agreement (see Complaint, Add. Ex. 1, j^ 24.), 
but the 1995 Agreement neither directly nor indirectly grants the Appellants any interest 
in the settlement proceeds. Further, because there were twenty-seven Federal Plaintiffs, 
the provision in paragraph 4.2 of the 1995 Agreement that the balance of the settlement 
proceeds should be delivered free and clear to "plaintiffs" is simply too indefinite to 
support any claims by Kirk, Martens, Western, or Syndicators to any particular sum of 
money. Finally, Appellants presented no evidence that they had any understanding that 
they would receive any particular portion of the settlement proceeds. Thus, Appellants 
have not established that the trial court erred in dismissing their claims for a share of the 
settlement proceeds. 
this assumes that such an agreement was reached) would have agreed to grant interests in 
the leases to the Appellants. 
22
 Appellants do not assert on appeal that they are entitled to damages in lieu of 
interests in the Oil Canyon Leases and the settlement proceeds. Accordingly, the portion 
of their claim below that sought damages was properly dismissed as well. Indeed, the 
indefmiteness of the 1995 Agreement plainly would defeat any such claim. Contract 
damages put the nonbreaching party "in as good as position as if the contract had been 
performed." Rg,, Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 940 (Utah 1999). Thus, a plaintiff 
claiming damages must show that if the contract had been performed, he would have been 
in a certain position (owning certain property, receiving certain funds, etc.), but instead, 
because the contract was not performed, he or she is in a less advantageous position. 
Thus, for any of the Appellants to recover damages, he would have to prove that if the 
contract had been performed — i.e., if Shaw had used his best efforts to negotiate a 
funding agreement — he "would have been" in a particular position. Once again, 
however, Appellants cannot do this, because as a matter of law, there is no way to 
reasonably predict what interests any of the Appellants would have received under a 
funding agreement that Shaw and the Federal Plaintiffs may have reached. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc., therefore respectfully requests that the Court 
affirm the grant of summary judgment dismissing with prejudice Appellants' claims 
against it, and that the Court award Del Rio the costs incurred on this appeal. 
DATED: May 12, 2004. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Stephen P. Horvat 
Attorneys for Del-Rio Resources, Inc. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, J. R. KIRK, JR., an individual, and 
STEVEN D. MARTENS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
DAN K. SHAW, an individual, and DEL-RIO 
RESOURCES, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT FOR 
DECLARATORY RELIEF; MONEY 
DAMAGES 
Case No. Ol ^U (oik 2 
Honorable 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, complain of defendants for declaratory 
relief and money damages, alleging as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Western United Mines, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently 
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal 
place of business in Tooele County. 
2. Plaintiff Syndicators, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently existing, in good 
standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake County. 
3. Plaintiff J. R. Kirk, Jr. is an individual residing in Tooele County. 
4. Plaintiff Steven D. Martens is an individual residing in Salt Lake County. 
5. Defendant Dan K. Shaw is an individual residing in Utah County. 
6. Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently 
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal 
place of business in Uintah County. 
7. Defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, and the case may be tried in 
this Court for the convenience of the parties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1. 
8. The parties hereto are parties to an "Agreement" dated May 12, 1995, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto. 
9. The Agreement provides in pertinent part for the assignment, to Shaw, of interests 
in two federal oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. U 10166 & U 019837) and two 
state oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. 44317 & 44318). 
10. The Agreement also provides for the funding, by Shaw, of litigation against the 
United States in which the parties hereto, excluding Shaw, were plaintiffs, Del-Rio 
Drilling Programs, Inc., et al v. The United States, United States Claims Court, 
Case No. 569-86L. 
11. The Agreement provides that Shaw would "use his best efforts to enter into an 
agreement with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to provide a maximum of thirty 
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thousand dollars ($30,000) to fund certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in 
such litigation." 
12. The Agreement provides that with respect to the $30,000 in litigation expenses, 
"[n]o expenses shall be paid by Shaw directly to persons who are plaintiffs in the 
litigation or to affiliates of plaintiffs." 
13. The Agreement provides that "[a]ny agreement between the plaintiffs and Shaw 
shall provide that if, as a result of the litigation, additional leases are awarded, such 
leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his affiliates); provided, however, plaintiff 
shall be entitled to a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in such additional 
leases." 
14. Shaw did in fact fund the lawsuit pursuant to agreement with plaintiffs. 
15. The lawsuit was settled pursuant to the terms of a "Settlement Agreement," a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto. 
16. The Settlement Agreement provides in pertinent part for extension of the terms of 
10 federal oil and gas leases, which do not include the two in the Agreement. 
17. The terms of the 10 leases would have expired without the litigation and the 
agreement contained in the Settlement Agreement extending their terms. 
18. Defendants herein expressly characterized those 10 leases as "returned leases." 
19. Plaintiffs are entitled to a beneficial interest in the 10 leases according to the 
Agreement. 
20. The Settlement Agreement also provides for a proposal that 8 tracts or sections of 
land be offered for lease. 
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21. Plaintiffs do not know if any of the 8 tracts or sections has been offered for lease. 
22. If so, plaintiffs are entitled to a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or sections 
according to the Agreement. 
23. The Settlement Agreement also provides for a cash award to plaintiffs of $300,000. 
24. Plaintiffs are entitled to interest in the $300,000 cash award according to the 
Agreement. 
25. Defendants in this case have proposed distribution of the settlement with the United 
States in a manner that is inconsistent with the Agreement. 
26. Specifically, defendants have denied plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc., J. R. 
Kirk, Jr. and Steven D. Martens any interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases. 
27. Defendants have proposed a distribution of interest in the leases to plaintiff 
Syndicators, Inc. that is less than what is provided for by the Agreement. 
28. Defendants have denied plaintiffs any interest in the cash award. 
29. Defendants have proposed a reimbursement to Shaw for litigation expenses that is 
inconsistent with the Settlement Agreement. 
30. Plaintiffs objected, in writing, to the proposed distribution. 
31. However, defendants notified plaintiffs that they intended to proceed with the 
proposed distribution notwithstanding plaintiffs' objection. 
32. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of a beneficial interest in the 10 federal oil and 
gas leases that is consistent with the Agreement. 
33. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or 
sections, assuming they have been offered for lease, consistent with the Agreement. 
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34. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of interest in the $300,000 cash award that is 
consistent with the Agreement. 
35. Alternatively, plaintiffs are entitled to damages consistent with the Agreement and 
according to proof. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for Judgment against defendants for (1) declaration 
of a beneficial interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases that is consistent with the 
Agreement; (2) declaration of a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or sections, assuming they 
have been offered for lease, which is consistent with the Agreement; (3) declaration of an 
interest in the $300,000 cash award that is consistent with the Agreement; (4) alternatively, 
damages consistent with the Agreement and according to proof; and (5) such other and 
further relief as is just and proper, 
lis [4^s DATED th  H* day of July, 2001. 
DALTON & KELLEY 
Donald L. Dal ton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Agreement entered into this frjL day of H ^ 1995, by and among Dan 
K. Shaw ("Shaw"), Del Rio Resources, Inc., a Utah Sdorporation ("Del Rio"); Western 
United Mines, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Western"); Syndicators, Inc., a Utah Corporation 
("Syndicators"), Lawrence C. Caldwell, II ("Caldwell"); Jay R. Kirk, Jr. ("Kirk") and Steven 
D. Martens ("Martens") 
RECITALS: 
WHEREAS, Del Rio is the "Lessee" of certain mineral, oil and gas leases (the 
"Federal Leases" between Del Rio as Lessee and the United States Government as 
Lessor. A description of the Federal Leases is set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
and by this reference made a part hereof; and 
WHEREAS, Western and Syndicators previously owned an interest in the Federal 
Leases; and 
WHEREAS, Kirk is the "Lessee" of record of certain mineral, oil and gas leases 
(the "State Leases") between Kirk as Lessee and the State of Utah as Lessor. A 
description of the State Leases is set forth in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof; and 
WHEREAS, Kirk is the record holder of the State Leases; and 
WHEREAS, pursuant to an Agreement dated November 30, 1993 (the "November 
1993 Agreement"), Shaw has provided funding to Del Rio in the amount of $791,260 to 
rework the following wells number 30-1 and 29-A located in the Federal leases described 
in Exhibit "B" attached hereto (the "Wells"); and 
WHEREAS, pursuant to his rights under the November 1993 Agreement, Shaw 
has demanded repayment of the amounts advanced for reworking the Wells, together 
with interest thereon but none of Del Rio, Western or Syndicators have the financial 
capability of repaying such advanced funds; and 
WHEREAS, under the November 1993 Agreement Del Rio, Western and 
Syndicators have assigned their interests in the Federal and State Leases to Shaw as 
collateral security for the advancement of funds used to rework the Wells pursuant to his 
rights under the November 1993 Agreement; and 
WHEREAS, Shaw has agreed to enter a settlement agreement relating to the 
funds owed to him and other matters in consideration for Del Rio, Syndicators, Western, 
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Kirk, Caldwell and Martens assigning all of their right title and interest in the Federal and 
State Leases to him; 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises contained herein and for 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby 
acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
1. Assignment of Lease and Other Interests. Del Rio, Western, Syndicators, 
Caldwell, Martens and Kirk (all of which are hereafter collectively referred to as the 
"assignors") each hereby assign, transfer and convey to Shaw (or to any assignee of 
Shaw), any and all of their right, title and interest in and to: 
(i) the Federal Leases and the State Leases; 
(ii) the surface property which is the subject of the Federal and State 
Leases; 
(iii) the Wells and any other wells drilled under the Federal and State 
Leases; 
(iv) all reports made to the United States Government Minerals 
Management Services and all Oil and Gas Reports made to the Utah State 
Tax Commission relating to the Federal or State Leases from 1989 to the 
present; 
(v) any reports, logs, agreements, or other records of any type or kind 
relating to the Federal or State Leases or the Wells; and 
(vi) all personal property and fixtures used at or in the Wells, including, but 
not limited to, pumps, pipes, casing and other equipment. 
For purposes of this Agreement, all of the rights assigned by Assignors to Shaw 
hereunder are hereafter referred to as the "Lease Rights". The parties hereby agree that 
the assignment of Lease Rights made hereby, shall be a complete and total assignment 
to Shaw of any and all rights and interest of each of the Assignors in the Lease Rights. 
Shaw is hereby authorized by Assignors to take such additional action as is reasonably 
necessary to effect the assignment of the Lease Rights made herein. Each of the 
Assignors will execute such additional documents and take such additional action as 
Shaw deems reasonably necessary to effect the assignment of the Lease Rights and to 
perfect title of the Lease Rights in Shaw. 
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2. Cancellation of Debt. In consideration of assignment of the Lease Rights 
by Assignors to Shaw, Shaw hereby forgives and cancels all debts owed to Shaw by Del 
Rio, Western and Syndicators which debts include, but are not limited to, the following: 
Amounts Owed 
Debtor To Shaw 
Del Rio $6,122.82 
Western $337.87 
Syndicators $2,065.89 
Del Rio, Western & Syndicator jointly $791,600.00 
Shaw will take such action as may be necessary to release all security interests 
securing any of such debt. 
2.1 In consideration of Caldwell, Kirk and Martens assigning any and all 
of their rights in the Lease Rights to Shaw, Shaw hereby indemnifies, holds harmless and 
releases Caldwell, Kirk and Martens from any debt owed by Caldwell, Kirk or Martens 
to Shaw and from any debt owed to Shaw by any other person and guaranteed by 
Caldwell, Kirk and Martens. 
3. Resolution of Vernal Investors Matter. Del Rio sold shares of its common 
stock to certain investors (the "Investors") in a private offering and in connection 
therewith received offering proceeds of approximately $132,000. Some of the Investors 
have expressed dissatisfaction with their investment in Del Rio and have questioned the 
adequacy of the disclosure given by Del Rio to the Investors in connection with their 
purchase of Del Rio securities. As additional consideration for the Assignors assigning 
all of their right, title and interest in the Lease Rights to Shaw, Shaw hereby agrees to 
use his best efforts to resolve questions or concerns that the Investors may have in 
connection with their investment in Del Rio. Shaw may, in an attempt to resolve such 
questions or concerns purchase the shares of Dei Rio common stock which the 
Investors acquired from Del Rio. Shaw hereby agrees to indemnify Del Rio, Caldwell, 
Kirk and Martens and save them harmless from any and all claims, damages and causes 
of action made by the Investors. 
4. Funding for Existing Litigation. Various individuals and companies are 
plaintiffs in a lawsuit filed against the United States in the United States Claims Courts 
involving a claim for oil and gas leases and money damages (Case No. 569-86L). 
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Plaintiffs require additional money to fund additional on-going litigation expenses. As 
additional consideration for Del Rio, Western, Syndicators, Kirk Caldwell and Martens 
entering into this Agreement, Shaw shall use his best efforts to enter into an agreement 
with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to provide a maximum of thirty thousand dollars 
($30,000) to fund certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in such litigation. The 
funds to be provided by Shaw shall not be used for legal fees but may be used for other 
litigation expenses. No expenses shall be paid by Shaw directly to persons who are 
plaintiffs in the litigation or to affiliates of plaintiffs. 
4.1 Any agreement between the plaintiffs and Shaw shall provide that 
if, as a result of the litigation, additional leases are awarded, such leases shall be 
assigned to Shaw (or his affiliates); provided, however, plaintiffs shall be entitled to a fifty 
percent (50%) beneficial interest in such additional leases. Shaw shall be the operator 
of such additional leases and the plaintiffs shall enter into a standard operating 
agreement with Shaw. If for any reason, the additional leases cannot, under the terms 
of any court decree or law, be put in the name of Shaw the parties shall take such action 
as may be necessary to provide Shaw with a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in 
such additional leases and to enter into an operating agreement with Shaw. 
4.2 Any agreement between plaintiff(s) and Shaw shall provide that, as 
a result of the litigation, a cash settlement is awarded to plaintiffs, Shaw shall be 
reimbursed for all expenses of litigation paid by Shaw and the balance of the proceeds 
shall be delivered free and clear of the claims of Shaw, to plaintiffs as damages and for 
payment of other expenses and costs of the litigation. 
5. Resignation of Officers and Directors of Del Rio. Subsequent to the 
execution of this Agreement and the assignment of the Lease Rights, Kirk and Martens 
shall resign as officers and directors of Del Rio. Whether prior to or subsequent to such 
resignation, Kirk and Martens shall use their best efforts to provide Shaw with all 
documentation and information in their possession or control necessary to effect the 
assignment of the Lease Rights and to provide Caldwell with all documentation and 
information in their possession necessary to prepare and file all tax returns of Del Rio, 
to prepare and have executed all directors minutes for current and previous actions of 
Del Rio's Board of Directors and to execute any other documents required to bring 
Del Rio current and in good standing in all of its reports, returns and filings and to effect 
the agreement of the parties contained herein. Each of Caldwell, Kirk and Martens shall 
fully cooperate with each other to provide information required by any of them necessary 
to prepare and file their individual tax returns. 
6. Appointment of New Directors and Officers. Within ten days after the 
resignations required by the preceding paragraph, Caldwell, as the remaining director, 
shall appoint two individuals to fill the vacancies on the Board of Directors in accordance 
with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-810. In the alternative, Caldwell shall 
schedule a special meeting of the shareholders to be held within twenty days of the date 
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of this Agreement to elect directors to fill the vacancies. Within ten days after the 
appointment or election of the new directors, the newly appointed or elected directors 
shall vote on a resolution authorizing Del Rio to execute and deliver to Kirk a Promissory 
Note in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "C". 
7. Conditions Precedent. The execution of the Promissory Note (Exhibit "C") 
in accordance with the procedures and within the time periods specified in the preceding 
paragraph shall constitute a condition precedent to the enforceability of this agreement 
as to Kirk. Kirk shall not be obligated to perform in accordance with the terms and 
provisions of this Agreement until said condition precedent has been fulfilled. In the 
event Del Rio does not execute the Promissory Note (Exhibit "C"), this Agreement shall 
be null and void. 
8. Representations and Warranties of Del Rio, Western and Syndicators. Del 
Rio, Western, Syndicators, Caldwell, Kirk and Martens represent and warrant that as to 
itself or himself, the following: 
8.1. Corporate Authority. Each of Del Rio, Western and Syndicators 
represent and warrant as to itself, that is has the full corporate power and authority to 
execute and deliver this Agreement and to consummate the transactions contemplated 
hereby. The execution and delivery of this Agreement and the consummation of the 
transactions contemplated hereby have been duly and validly authorized by the Boards 
of Directors of Del Rio, Western and Syndicators and no other corporate proceedings 
on their part are necessary to authorize this Agreement or to consummate the 
transactions so contemplated. Subject to the laws of bankruptcy, insolvency, general 
creditor's rights and equitable principles, this Agreement has been duly and validly 
executed and delivered by Del Rio, Western and Syndicators and constitutes a valid and 
binding agreement of each of Del Rio, Western and Syndicators, enforceable against 
each of Del Rio, Western and Syndicators in accordance with its terms. 
8.2. Authorization and Approval of Agreement. Each of Caldwell, Kirk 
and Martens separately represent and warrant as to himself only that he has the full 
power and authority to execute and deliver this Agreement and to consummate the 
transactions contemplated hereby. Subject to the laws of bankruptcy, insolvency, 
general creditors' rights and equitable principles, this Agreement has been duly and 
validly executed and delivered by each of Caldwell, Kirk and Martens and constitutes a 
valid and binding agreement enforceable against Caldwell, Kirk and Martens in 
accordance with its terms. 
8.3. Organization. Each of Del Rio, Western and Syndicators each 
separately represent and warrant as to itself that it is a corporation duly organized, 
validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah and has all 
requisite licenses, qualifications, corporate power and authority to own, lease and 
operate its assets and to carry on its business as now being conducted, except where 
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the failure to be so existing and in good standing or to have such qualifications, licenses, 
power and authority would not in the aggregate have a material adverse effect on its 
respective business, operations or financial condition. 
8.4. Approvals and Consents; Noncontravention. Each of Del Rio, 
Western and Syndicators separately represent as to itself. 
8.4.1. Except as described in Exhibit "D", no consent or approval or 
other action by, or notice to or registration or filing with any governmental or 
administrative agency or authority is required or necessary to be obtained by it 
Del Rio, Western or Syndicators in connection with the execution, delivery or 
performance of this Agreement by it or the consummation of the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement. 
8.4.2. No consent, approval, waiver or other action by any person 
under any material contract, agreement, instrument or other document, or 
obligation to which it is a party or by which it or any of its assets are bound, is 
required or necessary for the execution, delivery and performance of this 
Agreement or the consummation of the transactions contemplated by this 
Agreement. 
8.4.3. The execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement 
by and the consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement will 
not: (i) violate or conflict with its charter documents or Bylaws; (ii) violate or 
conflict with any law, regulation, order, judgment, award, administrative 
interpretation, injunction, writ or decree applicable to or by which it or any of its 
assets are bound, or any agreement or understanding between any administrative 
or regulatory authority, on the one hand, and it on the other hand; or (iii) violate 
or conflict with, result in a breach of, result in or permit the acceleration or 
termination of, or constitute a default under any agreement, instrument or 
understanding to which it is a party or by which it or any of its assets are bound. 
8.5. Title and Related Matters. The Federal Leases are in the name 
of Del Rio or Del Rio, Western and Syndicators as Lessees. The State Leases are 
in the name of Kirk. All of the Assignors represent and warrant that to the best 
of their knowledge, except as set forth in Exhibit "E" attached hereto, good and 
marketable title to the Federal Leases and the State Leases, free and clear of any 
liens, claims, encumbrances, royalty interests or other restrictions or limitations 
of any nature whatsoever, will be assigned to Shaw. Assignors each represent 
and warrant that to the best of their knowledge, the Federal and State Leases are 
in full force and effect and that there has been no breach of the lease agreement. 
8.6. Litigation and Proceedings. Each of the Assignors represents 
that it or he is not involved in any pending material litigation or governmental 
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investigation or proceeding relating to the Lease Rights and, to the best of his or 
its, knowledge no material litigation, claim, assessment or governmental 
investigation or proceeding is threatened against the Federal or State Leases, any 
Assignor or their assets, nor, to the best of his or its knowledge of is there any 
basis for such action. 
8.7. Contracts. Exhibit "P sets forth complete and correct copies 
of all material contracts, agreements, franchises, licensees, or other commitments 
related to or effecting the Lease Rights, including, but not limited to, the 
underlying lease agreements, assignment of lease agreements, working interest 
agreements, royalty agreements and operating agreements to which any Assignor 
is a party or by which any of the Lease Rights are bound, subject or effected. To 
the best of each of their knowledge, no Assignor is a party to any other material 
agreement, contract, license, franchise or commitment relating to or effecting the 
Lease Rights. To the best of each of their knowledge and subject to the laws of 
bankruptcy, insolvency, general creditor's rights, and equitable principles, all 
contracts, agreements, franchises, licensees, and other commitments to which 
any Assignor is a party relating to or effecting the Lease Rights, are material to 
its operations taken as a whole, are valid and enforceable in all material respects. 
8.8. Material Contract Defaults. To the best knowledge of each Assignor, 
such Assignor is not in default in any material respect under the terms of the Federal 
Lease or the State Lease or any outstanding contract, agreement, license, lease or other 
commitment which is material to the operation of the Lease Rights and their is no event 
of default or other event which, with notice or lapse of time or both, would constitute a 
default in any material respect under any such contract, agreement, lease or other 
commitment in respect of which such Assignor has not taken adequate steps to prevent 
such a default from occurring. 
8.9 Information. Subject to the limitations noted in this paragraph and 
in the following paragraph, the information concerning Assignors set forth in this 
Agreement and in the Exhibits attached hereto, is complete and accurate in all material 
respects and does not contain any untrue statement of material fact or omit to state a 
material fact required to make the statements made in light of the circumstances under 
which they were made not misleading. Shaw expressly acknowledges that his decision 
to enter into this Agreement and the Del Rio Subscription Agreement is based upon his 
independent investigation and information supplied solely by Larry Caldwell. Shaw 
further acknowledges that he has not requested, received or relied upon any information, 
warranties or representations from Del Rio, Western, Syndicators, Kirk or Martens except 
as expressly stated in this Agreement as being made by Del Rio, Western, Syndicators, 
Kirk or Martens. 
8.10 Limitation on Warranties and Representations. The warranties and 
representations of Western and Syndicators are made by the corporate entities only and 
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shall not be considered or relied upon as a warranty or representation of any officer, 
director, agent or employee of Western or Syndicators including, but not limited to, the 
officers, directors, agents or employees who execute this Agreement on behalf of 
Western and Syndicators. The warranties and representations of Del Rio are made by 
that corporate entity only and its officer and director, Larry Caldwell, and shall not be 
considered or relied upon as a warranty or representation of any other officer, director, 
agent or employee of Del Rio. J. R. Kirk, President of Western, represents only that the 
representations and warranties of Western stated in this Agreement are accurate to the 
best of his information, knowledge and belief. Steve Martens, President of Syndicators, 
represents only that the warranties and representations of Syndicators stated in this 
Agreement are accurate to the best of his information, knowledge and belief. 
9. Representations and Warranties of Purchaser. Shaw represents and 
warrants to Assignors as follows: 
9.1. Authorization and Approval of Agreement. Shaw has the full 
power and authority to execute and deliver this Agreement and to consummate 
the transactions contemplated hereby. Subject to the laws of bankruptcy, 
insolvency, general creditor's rights and equitable principles, this Agreement has 
been duly and validly executed and delivered by Shaw and constitutes a valid and 
binding agreement of Shaw, enforceable against Shaw in accordance with its 
terms. 
9.2 Approvals and Consents; Noncontravention. To the best 
knowledge of Shaw, no consent, approval, waiver or other action by any person 
under any material contract, agreement, instrument or other document, or 
obligation to which Shaw is a party or by which i: or any of his assets are bound, 
is required or necessary for the execution, delivery and performance of this 
Agreement by Shaw or the consummation of the transactions contemplated by 
this Agreement. 
10. Appointment of Del Rio as Operator. Shaw will appoint Del Rio as the 
operator of oil and gas wells which are drilled or reworked on the Federal Leases and 
the State Leases. Such appointment shall be made pursuant to the terms of an 
operator's agreement provided by shaw. 
11. Indemnification. 
11.1. Subject to the acknowledgments stated in paragraph 8.9 and 
the limitations stated in paragraph 8.10, assignors hereby agree to indemnify and 
hold Shaw harmless from, against and in respect of (and shall on demand 
reimburse Shaw for): 
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11.1.1. Any and all loss, liability or damage suffered or incurred by 
Shaw by reason of any untrue representation, breach of warranty or nonfulfillment 
of any covenant by Assignors contained herein or in any certificate, document or 
instrument delivered to Shaw pursuant hereto or in connection herewith; 
11.1.2. Any and all loss, liability or damage suffered or incurred by 
Shaw in respect of or in connection with any liabilities of Assignors not expressly 
assumed by Shaw pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 
11.1.4. Any and all actions, suits, proceedings, claims, demands, 
assessments, judgments, costs and expenses, including without limitation, legal 
fees and expenses, incident to any of the foregoing or incurred in investigating 
or attempting to avoid the same or to oppose the imposition thereof or in 
enforcing this subsection 11.1. 
11.2. Shaw hereby agrees to indemnify and hold Assignors harmless from, 
against and in respect of (and shall on demand reimburse them for): 
11.2.1. Any and all loss, liability or damage resulting from any untrue 
representation, breach of warranty or non-fulfillment of any covenant or agreement 
by Shaw contained herein or in any certificate, document or instrument delivered 
to Assignors hereunder; 
11.2.2. Any and all liabilities or obligations of Assignors specifically 
assumed by Shaw pursuant to this Agreement; and 
11.2.3. Any and all actions, suits, proceedings, claims, demands, 
assessments, judgements, costs and expenses, including without limitation, legal 
fees and expenses, incident to any of the foregoing or incurred in investigating 
or attempting to avoid the same or to oppose the imposition thereof or in 
enforcing this sub Section 11.2. 
12. Nature and Survival of Representations. Subject to the acknowledgements 
stated in Paragraph 8.9 and the limitations stated in Paragraph 8.10, all representations, 
warranties and covenants made by any party in this Agreement shall survive the Closing 
hereunder and the consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby. All of the 
parties hereto are executing and carrying out the provisions of this Agreement in reliance 
solely on the representations, warranties and covenants and agreements contained in 
this Agreement or at the Closing of the transactions herein provided for and not upon 
any representation, warranty, agreement, promise or information, written or oral, made 
by the other party or any other person other than as specifically set forth herein. 
13. Miscellaneous. 
i\> 
13.1 Further Assurances, At any time and from time to time, after the 
effective date, each party will execute such additional instruments and take such action 
as may t>e reasonably requested by the other party to confirm or obtain title to the Lease 
Rights transferred hereunder or otherwise to carry out the intent and purposes of this 
Agreement. 
13.2 Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
between the parties pertaining to the subject matter of this Agreement and supersedes 
all prior agreements, understandings, negotiations and discussions, whether oral or 
written, of the parties, and there are no warranties, representations or other agreements 
between the parties in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement except as 
specifically set forth in this Agreement. 
13.3 Effect; Assignment. This Agreement and all of the provisions of this 
Agreement will be binding and inure to the benefit of the parties to this Agreement and 
their respective successors and permitted assigns. 
13.4 Amendments: Waivers. No supplement, modification or amendment 
of this Agreement will be binding unless executed in writing by all parties to this 
Agreement. No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement will be deemed or will 
constitute a waiver of any other provision of this Agreement (regardless of whether 
similar), nor will any such waiver constitute a continuing waiver unless otherwise 
expressly provided. 
13.5 Governing Law. The terms of this Agreement will be governed by, 
and construed in accordance with, the internal laws of the State of Utah. 
13.6 Headings. The section and subsection headings in this Agreement 
are inserted for convenience only and shall not affect in any way the meaning or 
interpretation of this Agreement. 
13.7 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed concurrently in two 
or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which 
together shall constitute one and the same instrument. 
13.8 Severability. If any of this Agreement is deemed to be unenforceable, 
the balance of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement the day and 
year first above written. 
10 
Individuals 
Lawrence C. Caldwell, II 
Steven D. Martens / 




By: k^T^U^ j^/%^J%y 
Its "President / 
Western United Mines, Inc. 
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EXHIBIT TV 
Description of Federal Leases 
Mineral Lease No. U 10166. Del Rio, Western, Syndicators, Caldwell, Kirk and 
Martens incorporate by reference Assignment of Record Title interest in a Lease for Oil 
and Gor Geothermal Resources delivered to Dan K. Shaw on or about May 12, 1995. 
Mineral Lease No. U 019837. Del Rio, Western, Syndicators, Caldwell, Kirk and 
Martens incorporate by reference Assignment of Record Title interest in a Lease for Oil 
and Gas or Geothermal Resources delivered to Dan K. Shaw on or about May 12, 1995. 
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EXHIBIT "B1 
Description of State Leases 
Mineral Lease No. 44317. Kirk incorporates by reference the Mineral Lease 
Assignment Forms for Lease 44317 delivered to Dan K. Shaw on or about May 12, 1995. 
Mineral Lease No. 44318. Kirk incorporates by reference the Mineral Lease 
Assignment Forms for Lease 44318 delivered to Dan K. Shaw on or about May 12, 1995. 
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Tab 3 
A. John Davis (#0825) 
Shawn T.Welch (#7113) 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL 
1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8446 
Attorneys for Dan K. Shaw 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Stephen P. Horvat (#6249) 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Del-Rio Resources, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN UNITED MINES, 
INC. a Utah corporation, 
SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, J.R. KIRK, JR., an ORDER AND 
individual, and STEVEN D. : SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MARTENS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : Case No. 010906368 
Judge Roger A. Livingston 
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The Court heard oral argument on Defendants Dan K. Shaw's and Del-Rio 
Resources, Inc.'s Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on October 28, 2002 in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Thomas A. Karrenberg appeared on behalf of Defendant Del-Rio 
Resources, Inc.; A. John Davis and Shawn T. Welch appeared on behalf of Defendant 
Dan K. Shaw; and Donald L. Dalton appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs Western United 
Mines, Inc., Syndicators, Inc., J.R. Kirk, Jr., and Steven D. Martens. The Court, 
having reviewed the Defendants' Joint Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition and Defendants' Joint 
Reply Memorandum, and having heard counsel's oral arguments, hereby makes the 
following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of partial summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants Shaw and Del-Rio Resources. 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. This action concerns an agreement dated May 12, 1995 (the "1995 
Agreement"), wherein defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. and Plaintiffs assigned 
certain oil and gas leases to defendant Shaw in settlement of a debt owed to defendant 
Shaw. 
2. Paragraphs 4 through 4.2 of the 1995 Agreement reference a lawsuit then 
pending in the United States Court of Claims involving a claim for money damages 
relating to certain oil and gas leases. The case was styled Del-Rio Drilling Programs, 
Inc., et al. vs. United States, Case No. 569-86L (hereinafter the "Federal Action"). 
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The Plaintiffs in the Federal Action included the Plaintiffs herein, Defendant Del-Rio 
Resources and some 22 other individuals and entities (the "Federal Plaintiffs"). 
3. The oil and gas leases at issue in the Federal Action consisted of ten 
Federal oil and gas leases identified as follows: U-6610, U-6612, U-6632, U-6634, U-
10162, U-10163, U-10164, U-10165, U-1876, and U-27043 ("Federal Leases"). 
4. Paragraph 4 of the 1995 Agreement references the "various individuals 
and companies" who were plaintiffs in the Federal Action, and provides: 
As additional consideration for Del Rio, Western, Syndicators, Kirk 
Caldwell and Martens entering into this Agreement, Shaw shall use his 
best efforts to enter into an agreement with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to 
provide a maximum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) to fund 
certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in such litigation 
5. Paragraph 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement provides, in relevant part: "Any 
agreement between the Plaintiffs and Shaw shall provide that if, as a result of the 
litigation, additional leases are awarded, such leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his 
affiliates); provided, however, plaintiffs shall be entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in 
such additional leases." 
6. Paragraph 4.2 of the 1995 Agreement provides, in relevant part: 
Any agreement between plaintiff(s) and Shaw shall provide that, as a 
result of the litigation, a cash settlement is awarded to plaintiffs, Shaw 
shall be reimbursed for all expenses of litigation paid by Shaw and the 
balance of the proceeds shall be delivered free and clear of the claims of 
Shaw, to plaintiffs as damages and for payment of other expenses and 
costs of the litigation. 
3 
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7. The Federal Action was resolved by a Settlement Agreement dated March 
13, 2001, which stated that the terms of the ten Federal Leases at issue in the Federal 
Action were deemed "tolled" during the pendency of the Federal Action and were 
extended for three years from the date of settlement. In addition, the United States 
Bureau of Land Management agreed to pay the Federal Plaintiffs $300,000.00 in 
damages. 
8. Plaintiffs herein sued Defendants asking this Court for a declaration that 
the 1995 Agreement entitled them to an interest in the ten Federal Leases as well as an 
interest in the $300,000.00 cash award, or in the alternative, damages consistent with 
the 1995 Agreement. 
9. The 1995 Agreement does not grant Plaintiffs herein any interest in the 
ten Federal Leases or the $300,000 cash award in the Federal Action, and Plaintiffs' 
claims thereunder are denied with prejudice. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED THAT: 
1. Defendants Dan K. Shaw and Del-Rio Resources, Inc.'s Joint Motion For 
Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs is hereby granted. 
2. The Court hereby grants Plaintiffs leave to amend Plaintiffs' Complaint 
herein to state a claim for damages against defendant Dan K. Shaw for breach of the 
"best efforts to enter into an agreement" provision in Paragraph 4 of the 1995 
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settlement. In granting such right to amend, the Court in no way rules as to the merit 
of Plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs shall file such amendment within ten days of the entry of 
this Order and Judgment. 
3. Each party shall bear its respective costs herein. 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
Consistent with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court 
hereby directs entry of the above order and judgment as final judgment. In directing a 
final judgment as to same, the Court specifically and expressly finds that there is no just 
reason for delay and that judgment shall be and is final as to the above-referenced 
matters. 
Dated this \\ day of November, 2002. 
3er*A<^ivii3gs^n, District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
DALTON & KELLEY 
By 
Donald L. Dal ton 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 010906368 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, respectfully submit the following 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint: 
At the hearing on October 28, 2002, the Court (Honorable Roger A. Livingston) 
granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the same time, the Court granted 
plaintiffs leave to file a First Amended Complaint stating a claim against defendant Dan K. 
Shaw for breach of the "best efforts" clause in the 1995 Agreement. 
w 
The Court's action has required further amendment of the Complaint, specifically, 
a claim against defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. for declaration of plaintiffs' rights and 
interest in the oil and gas leases and cash award that resulted from the settlement of the 
Claims Court Litigation. 
In their original Complaint, plaintiffs sought a declaration of their rights and 
interest in the oil and gas leases and cash award pursuant to the terms of the 1995 
Agreement. However, the Court's ruling was that the 1995 Agreement granted plaintiffs 
no rights or interest in the oil and gas leases or cash award. 
Plaintiffs' amended claim against defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is not based 
on the 1995 Agreement. As evidenced by the pleadings on file in the Claims Court 
Litigation, plaintiffs have rights and interest in the leases and cash award that are 
independent of the 1995 Agreement. 
At the time this action was filed, plaintiffs did not think it was necessary to state 
such a claim because they thought their rights and interest were clear from the 1995 
Agreement. Plaintiffs' proposed amendment brings all of plaintiffs' claims to the leases 
and cash award into this action where they can be decided once and for all. 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs request leave to file their First Amended 
Complaint. 
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DATED this (2P^3ay of November, 2002. 
DALTON & KELLEY 
By V A A A ^ J L V C 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS WILL CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File First Amended 
Complaint" to be mailed, postage prepaid, this \2^^cTay of November, 2002 to: 
A. John Davis, III 
Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell 
Suite 1850, Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City UT 84111-1495 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City UT 84101-2006 
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